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Abstract 
In modern times, imprisonment has been established as punishment and not for punishment, 
which means that the only right that is suspended has to do with freedom of movement. 
Nevertheless, serving a sentence in Chilean prisons has become a form of continuous punishment 
that extends far beyond the mere deprivation of liberty. Indeed, Chilean prisons have been 
criticized for their levels of overcrowding, lack of access to rehabilitative programs, and for their 
levels of mistreatment towards inmates. In addition, violence has become a common, daily 
reality in many facilities throughout the country. Its occurrence is problematic not only because 
it threats security and order inside prisons, but also because it undermines any attempt to 
successfully develop rehabilitative initiatives inside prison walls. Despite that prison violence 
has been studied in developed nations, much remains unanswered for developing countries. 
Thus, this dissertation will try to fill part of this gap by analyzing the correlates of violent events 
in Chilean prisons as well as by examining which theory of prison violence (among deprivation, 
administrative-control and importation) seemed to better explain the study’s results. In order to 
do that, this study employed a combination of both administrative data from the Chilean Bureau 
of Prisons (Gendarmería de Chile) and some results of the First National Survey on Inmates’ 
Perception of Quality of Life, conducted in 2013 (Sanhueza, in press). Anchored in the literature 
review and on empirical findings on prison violence, this study included six representative 
indicators coming for the three theories tested, while controlling for total inmate population size. 
Then, descriptive analyses and a series of multivariate, negative binomial regression models 
were run. Main results indicated that the two importation variables (average inmates’ age and the 
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proportion of inmates highly-engaged in criminal activities) and the control variable remained 
significant in the full model. Finally, this study highlights some of their possibilities and 
limitations, as well as suggests some further research questions and policy implications.
viii 
 
CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
According to many international legal systems, including the Chilean one, when an 
individual is sent to prison and deprived of liberty, the only right that is suspended while s/he is 
incarcerated is freedom of movement (Coyle, 2003; Richardson, 1993).  Furthermore, in modern, 
Western societies, imprisonment is imposed on individuals as punishment, not for punishment 
(Ignatieff, 1978).  In other words, incarcerated individuals should have access to the same rights 
(i.e., health, education, human and civil rights) as those who are on the outside, except for 
freedom of movement (Alzúa, Rodríguez & Villa, 2008).  Consequently, international human 
rights agreements have defined a variety of prison standards in order to respect inmates’ human 
dignity.  In the same vein, scholars have translated these normative standards into indicators, 
including “prison decency” (Richardson, 1993), “healthy prisons” (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Prisons [HMIP], 2012), or “the moral performance” of a prison system (Liebling, 2004).   
Nevertheless, a variety of pressures from politicians, governments, mass media, and even 
citizens have made the as-punishment premise less certain and have put consideration for the 
human rights of the incarcerated at risk (Cavadino et al., 1999; Garland, 2001).  A number of 
human rights reports have expressed concerns about prisons in Chile not only because of 
overcrowding (which reaches 30% on average) and infrastructure problems, but also because of 
the many ways in which the prisons’ daily functioning compromises inmates’ dignity: many fear 
for their safety; most lack medical assistance; few have access to productive activities and even 
fewer to drug treatment; there is an exaggerated use of solitary-confinement and, moreover,  a
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significant percentage of inmates will have been tortured while in solitary confinement (Instituto 
Nacional de Derechos Humanos [INDH], 2013; Dammert, 2012; Sanhueza, in press).  These 
practices violate international standards and threaten inmates’ chances for a successful 
reintegration. 
Given this precarious scenario, the reality of prison violence emerges as a common, 
dangerous situation faced by almost every facility in the country.  Indeed, survey data from a 
nationwide study conducted in 2013 (Sanhueza, in press) shows that a high proportion of 
respondents declared having suffered physical maltreatment by other inmates (21.1%) and by 
uniformed personnel (38.7%).  In addition, psychological mistreatment was present, with 33.7% 
of respondents declaring they had suffered psychological mistreatment from other inmates and 
44.3% from guards.  Moreover, violence in Chilean prisons also entails interpersonal fights, 
resulting in hurt and/or dead inmates; the use (and fabrication) of artisan knives, lancets and 
other weapons; the existence of inmate-on-staff assaults; and even the occurrence of prison fires 
or riots, which constitute a daily threat for prison personnel and for the inmates themselves. 
Thus, the purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the main correlates of violent events in 
Chilean prison facilities during 2012 based on three theories of prison violence: deprivation, 
importation and administrative-control.  The main research questions have to do with what 
variables can account for the occurrence of violent events in Chilean prisons and with which 
theory of prison violence is most empirically supported.  In order to address these questions, I 
employed a combination of both administrative and survey data at the facility level from 75 
prisons throughout Chile.  The main results indicated that, when considered separately, the three 
theories of prison violence explored here (deprivation, importation, and administrative control) 
were able to account for variations in violent events; when considered in the same model, the 
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importation variables (inmates’ average age and a measure of criminal engagement), along with 
total population size, acquired prominence. 
Overview of the Prison System in Chile  
The Chilean Bureau of Prisons (Gendarmería de Chile) is the public entity in charge of 
providing security, services, and rehabilitation programs for the sentenced or held-for-trial 
individuals under its control.  Generally speaking, the Gendarmería—which has more than 
17,000 employees nationwide—works with three categories of employees: i) prison officers, ii) 
prison guards, and iii) administrative or professional staff.1 
After Pinochet’s regime ended in 1990, there was increasing concern for human rights in 
Chile, including the situation of prisons in the country.  For example, Diego Portales University 
prepared a series of reports on the situation of human rights in Chile and included a chapter on 
the human rights of the incarcerated. Other organizations, such as the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights, noticed that prison overcrowding severely damaged inmates’ 
living conditions and limited their chances for a successful rehabilitation.  These organizations 
denounced these poor conditions, noting that even in democracy, inmates suffered torture, 
mistreatment, and other abuses that went against the standards for humane treatment. 
In response, the Chilean government implemented prison privatization as a way to deal 
with overcrowding.  Initially, the private companies were going to build the prisons, since 
construction is one of the most expensive components of prison operation. The private 
companies would also operate the services inside the prisons (food, rehabilitative programs, sport 
activities, and so on), while the Gendarmería would continue to provide custody.  However, the 
1 This includes psychologists, social workers, physicians, sociologists, administrative staff, and other non-custody-
related personnel. 
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additional spots that privatization was supposed to create were neutralized by other changes to 
the prison system.   
In the early 2000s, the Chilean government designed and implemented major changes in 
the penal process, in what was called “Penal Process Reform” (PPR).  This change looked to 
accelerate the entire penal process in order to avoid holding individuals for trial for indefinite 
periods of time without a sentence.  In addition, PPR directed major additional funds to the 
different actors who participate in penal prosecution, such as prosecutors, the Chilean police, 
judges, and investigators.  As a result, more individuals were prosecuted and found guilty and 
sent to prison.  However, these changes to the penal process gave no additional funding to the 
Gendarmería de Chile, which was in charge of providing custody and treatment to offenders.  
Thus, prison overcrowding increased again and neutralized the additional spots that had been 
brought in by prison privatization. 
In the beginning of the 2010s, the Chilean Ministry of Justice decided to create a 
commission called the Council for Prison Reform (CPR) in order to analyze the prison system 
and propose changes.  The diagnosis prepared by CPR stated that in the last decade prisons have 
been overused to sanction deviant behavior and crimes. In addition, the CPR report stated that 
both prison policy and practice have focused on prison infrastructure (through privatization), 
with an excessive emphasis on security above rehabilitation and with poor results in terms of 
recidivism (Consejo para la Reforma Penitenciaria, 2010).  Moreover, CPR noted additional 
problems affecting the Chilean prison system, such as overcrowding, the lack of infrastructure 
for programs, the low access to them, the precarious quality of psychosocial interventions, lack 
of support for prisoner reentry, and poor coordination of relevant actors beyond the 
Gendarmería. 
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 In addition, the CPR proposed a variety of changes to be made in order to improve the 
Chilean prison system.  Some of the areas identified by CPR had to do with the need to 
rationalize the use of prisons as a social sanction, to improve the system of sanctions outside the 
prisons and probation system, to design and implement better in-prison intervention programs, 
and to reinforce the prisoner reentry component of penal sanctions, among some others.  
Additional tactics intended to target overcrowding included a variety of measures such as 
administrative absolutions (and deportation) for foreign prisoners and petty criminals, the 
augmentation of early and/or gradual release programs, and the increased use of alternative 
sanctions outside prison.  As a result, in recent years, the rate of incarceration has dropped from 
318 in 2008 to 267 in 2014, breaking the tendency toward growth of last two decades.  Thus, 
currently, the Chilean penitentiary system holds about 43,000 prisoners with an incarceration rate 
of around 265 individuals behind bars per 100,000 inhabitants (International Centre for Prison 
Studies [ICPS], 2012) and an estimated recidivism rate of 50% (Morales et al., 2012).   
Table 1: Individuals under penal control in Chile (May 31, 2014) 
Type of System Men Women Total 
Total 107,25 13,393 121,118 
Prisons (Closed System) 39,654 3,197 42,851 
Semi-Open System 630 99 729 
Probation (Open System) 43,149 7,071 50,220 
Post-Prison System 24,292 3,026 27,318 
Source: Gendarmería de Chile, http://www.Gendarmería.gob.cl/ 
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In 2012, a new law (20,603) introduced a catalogue of new sanctions as substitutes for 
incarceration, including the electronic monitoring of certain offenders.  However, due to various 
difficulties in enacting the law, the implementation of law 20,603 was delayed, and the new 
system has not entered into operation yet.  At the same time, during 2012 to 2013, the Chilean 
Ministry of Justice intended to give a new boost to in-prison intervention programs with inmates 
in order to reduce recidivism and better prepare them for their release to communities.  Thus, 
based on a risk-need-responsivity (RNR) model for offenders’ treatment (Andrews, Bonta & 
Wormith, 2011), the government intended to tackle the lack of consistency that generally 
characterizes rehabilitative efforts in Chile, where there have been different—but disconnected—
initiatives in this vein. 
Finally, the Gendarmería tried to formulate a new, human rights-based prison policy and 
created the “Unit for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights,” whose mission was the 
creation of an internal culture of respect for and promotion of the dignity of inmates.  Between 
2012 and 2013, the Unit developed a variety of educational initiatives for prison personnel 
nationwide, proposed changes to the use of solitary confinement in the country, and conducted 
the first Inmates’ Survey on the Perception of Quality of Prison Life to determine a baseline for 
the entire system.   
Although this dissertation has thus far only discussed the situation of inmates in Chilean 
prisons, the situation of prison personnel—particularly the guards and staff members who work 
directly with inmates—is by no means better than that of the incarcerated.  Prison guards are 
simultaneously supposed to perform functions related to the custody of inmates, to maintain 
order and security in the facilities, to aid the rehabilitation of prisoners, and to attend to the 
provision of activities and services for them.  Furthermore, prison officers and guards usually 
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perform these varied duties with little training;2 many are continuously be threatened by violent 
inmates, and they risk their lives when trying to stop revolts or fights. They work in poorly 
equipped, unpleasant facilities to serve a very complex population for very low pay (INDH, 
2012; Espinoza & Martinez, 2007).   
In sum, the dehumanizing conditions for both inmates and prison workers combined with 
a variety of pressures from the government to be “tough on crime” have created in Chile a 
vicious cycle of higher incarceration, increased overcrowding, poor conditions, problematic 
“rehabilitation” programs, and higher levels of recidivism (Dammert & Zúñiga, 2008; Morales et 
al., 2012).   
Theories of prison violence 
But why does prison violence occur? Many explanations have been proposed to answer 
this question, and different scholars have offered explanations that focus on individual 
characteristics of the offenders, the conditions of confinement, the role of prison authorities, and 
the specific characteristics of violent situations.  In the present study, I have included four of the 
major theoretical perspectives that have been used to account for prison violence: the deprivation 
model, the importation model, the situational model, and the administrative-control model.   
The deprivation model, whose proto-foundations can be found in Clemmer’s work 
(1940), states that prison violence merges as an adaptive response to the strains of the 
institutional life experienced by inmates.  Sykes (1958), in The Society of Captives, described in 
great detail “the pains of imprisonment” as inmates are deprived of a variety of material and 
2 In general, all custody personnel (prison officers and guards) apply to enter the Prison Academy, which depends on 
Gendarmería.  When selected, their training may take between 6-9 months for prison guards and between 12-18 
months for prison officers, depending on demand.   
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symbolic benefits from the free environment (goods, services, heterosexual relationships, 
autonomy, and security) and argued that inmates’ behavior, including misconduct, would reflect 
adaptive responses to such losses.   Deprivation theorists argue that inmates react to the variety 
of losses by developing an inmate subculture with negative attitudes, values, and self-concepts 
that turns into permanent opposition to the administration and staff (Paterline & Petersen, 1999; 
Sykes & Messinger, 1960; Thomas, 1977).  Thus, the deprivation model assigns the explanation 
for violence to the condition of prison itself, beyond the inmates’ characteristics.  Consequently, 
the model has employed indicators of overcrowding, security level of the facility, visiting 
patterns, prison programs, and sentence length (Cooley, 1993; Gaes, 1994; Goodstein & Wright, 
1989; McCorkle, Miethe, & Drass, 1995; Cao et al., 1997; Wright, 1991) 
On the other hand, the importation model (Irwin & Cressey, 1962) states that inmates do 
not arrive in prison in a vacuum, in order to be molded by the correctional institution.  According 
to this theory, inmate organization and conduct reflect the values and behavioral repertoires that 
offenders brought with them into the prison from the outside, as a result of pre-prison 
experiences and the inmates’ own socio-cultural backgrounds (Irwin, 1981; Irwin & Cressey, 
1962; Irwin, 1970).  In addition, the circumstances of pain and deprivation caused by 
imprisonment would not be experienced by every inmate in the same way; they would exhibit 
different abilities to meet their needs in prison (Bonta & Gendreau, 1990; Bukstel & Kilmann, 
1980; Seymour, 1977; Toch, 1977), which would certainly include different capacities for the 
use of force and violence.  Finally, the original idea of “a society of captives” that has been 
deprived of goods and services becomes problematic, since inmates do not constitute a 
homogeneous, solitary group; there are different subgroups with different belief systems and 
norms, including many gangs (Carroll, 1974; Irwin & Cressey, 1962; Jacobs, 1977; Wooldredge, 
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1991).  Importation scholars have considered different variables in their research, including 
individual-level inmate variables that were present prior to incarceration, to explain prison 
violence; this includes such variables as race, sex, age, marital status, education level, previous 
convictions, employment, type of crime, gang membership, drug use, and some personality 
variables (Goodstein & Wright, 1989; Wooldredge, 1991; Wright, 1991; DeLisi, 2003).   
Despite the fact that both the deprivation and the importation theories of prison violence 
have dominated debate, both models have been conceptually and methodologically criticized.  
Some scholars, for example, have criticized both models as too general (Porporino & Zamble, 
1984; Paterline & Petersen, 1999), while others have pointed out that the two models use varying 
and ambiguous measures (Porporino & Zamble, 1984) and have included only a limited number 
of variables (Paterline & Petersen, 1999).  In addition, both models have been criticized for 
overlooking important situational factors that could explain adjustment to prison life (Steinke, 
1991) or the influential role of officers, since they run the prisons (Di Iulio, 1987).   
The administrative-control model assumes that prison officials and administrators are 
critical determinants of inmate behavior, including individual and collective violence, since they 
are, to a great extent, those who run the prisons (Di Iulio, 1987; Reisig, 2002).  Proponents of 
this model maintain that failures in prison management have been associated with severe forms 
of inmate violence, including inmate homicides (Reisig, 2002) and collective riots (Useem & 
Kimball, 1989).  Research has also shown that the managerial style of prison administrators and 
officers is a good predictor of job satisfaction and role strain among correctional staff (Reisig & 
Lovrich 1998; Stohr et al.  1994), which can, in turn, influence inmates’ in-prison and post-
prison outcomes, including violence (Craig, 2004).   
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Despite its explanatory strength, this approach has been received with criticism, as there 
are other factors—such as the security level of the facility or prison crowding—that have been 
linked to prison violence (Martin, Lichtenstein, Jenkot & Forde, 2012; Huey & Mcnulty, 2005).   
In addition, the individual characteristics of inmates and staff (Goodstein & Wright, 1989; 
Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2008; Moster & Jeglic, 2009) are additional factors that may mediate 
the relationship between prison management and violence. 
My research project: Exploring correlates of Prison Violence in Chilean Prisons 
Although these theories have received considerable scholarly attention, the vast majority 
of the empirical research comes from developed countries, and the phenomenon of prison 
violence remains relatively unexamined in Latin American contexts.  Thus, even though prison 
violence is a common, widespread problem in Chile, no systematic research has been conducted 
to study this phenomenon or its correlates nationwide, beyond anecdotal evidence and a few 
qualitative pieces.  As a result, prison administrators have little systematic knowledge for 
reducing violence and, thus, little expertise for creating a healthier prison environment that is 
more supportive of inmates’ treatment (Pollock et al., 2012; Liebling, 2004). The overall 
objective of this dissertation is to enhance our understanding of violence in Chilean prisons and 
to explore its main correlates, as well as to use local data to examine further the 
importation/deprivation/administrative-control debate.  My overarching research question for 
this project asks which variables account for violent events at the aggregate level in Chilean 
prisons and which theory receives the most empirical support. 
Given the broad and multifaceted nature of prison violence (McGuirre, 2008) and the fact 
that there is no agreed-upon benchmark for the conceptualization of in-prison violence (Jackson 
& Brownstein, 2004), it is important to provide a definition of “prison violence.” This definition 
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is important because, even in developed countries, research on prison violence has shown that 
violence occurs in different forms and has multiple dimensions (Wolff et al., 2008).  Thus, in this 
study “prison violence” will be understood according to these criteria: 
- The occurrence involves physical violence.   
- The occurrence is interpersonal and involves intentional violence (Jackson & Brownstein, 
2004). 
- The occurrence refers to a violent event that registered in official records as a serious 
violent offence, including those events that only result in serious injury (requiring 
medical treatment—cut, bleeding, unconscious, etc.) (Thornberry et al., 1995). 
- The occurrence may be deadly or non-deadly, but it involves the use of a weapon (usually 
a handmade one) made for the purpose of damaging the other person. 
- The occurrence is primarily inmate-on-inmate violence (not inmate-staff violence). 
In contrast, “those acts in which someone was hurt or injured, but perhaps only in a minor 
way (…) hitting, getting into fights and so on” (Thornberry et al., 1995, p.224) will not be 
included in the present study.  Also excluded are attempted-but-not-committed acts of physical 
violence, any sort of sexual assault, and any form of exercising psychological violence.   
Research Objectives and Data 
Following decades of theoretical debates and empirical studies, researchers seem to agree 
that different variables are associated with prison violence. Furthermore, the study of prison 
violence and guidelines for its reduction have taken a critical impetus for more humane treatment 
of prisoners, as well as an important step toward building a safer society given the expected 
reduction of recidivism. Questions regarding the correlates of prison violence in Chile remain 
unanswered, however. The overall objective of this dissertation, therefore, is to investigate the 
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correlates of prison violence by testing indicators from three theoretical approaches, namely the 
deprivation model, the importation and the administrative-control model3 and thus, the main 
research questions of the study are:  
1. What are the main correlates of violent events in Chilean prisons? 
2. Which model of prison violence here considered (deprivation, importation or 
administrative-control) is more supported by empirical findings when competing 
models of prison violence are analyzed together?  
To answer these research questions, this study uses a combination of aggregated, facility-
level data from two sources: administrative records from the Gendarmería and survey data from 
the First National Survey on Inmates’ Perception of Quality of Prison Life conducted in 2013.  
Details of the datasets and the samples for this study are described in the Methods section. 
Research Significance 
Different scholars have argued that a violent prison environment in general, along with 
the occurrence of more serious, specific violent episodes, constitute a serious threat to the 
creation and maintenance of a human rights-based prison environment, a pre-requisite for a 
successful rehabilitation (Ward, Gannon & Birgden, 2007; Liebling, 2004).  At the same time, if 
a safer society is to be achieved, greater attention must be paid to the dynamics that occur inside 
prisons, as they will probably impact future recidivism and possibilities for creating a safer 
society (Dias, 2011; Teixeira, 2012; Katz, Levitt & Schusstorovic, 2003; Chen & Shapiro, 2004; 
Drago, Galviati & Bertova, 2011; Petersilia, 2003).  Thus, the study of prison violence becomes 
relevant as it negatively affects inmates’ quality of life and is detrimental to inmates’ reentry. 
3 The focus on these three approaches mainly has to do with data availability 
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The study presented here is significant in that it differs from many prior studies in three 
aspects.  First, to the author’s knowledge, this is the first in-depth and comprehensive study of 
prison violence in Chilean facilities.  The study, therefore, has valuable policy implications 
prison administrators and for the design of prison programs with the goal of reducing prison 
violence.  Second, whereas most studies tend to rely only on administrative records, this study 
employs a combination of administrative data and survey data with information at the aggregate 
prison level, thereby offering an innovative approach to the study of prison violence.  Finally, 
this study contrasts three approaches that rarely have been considered all together, namely the 
deprivation, the importation and the administrative-control models of prison violence. 
Dissertation Organization 
The rest of the dissertation has been divided into four chapters.  Chapter Two, the 
Literature Review section, provides a summary and a critical analysis of theories and empirical 
evidence on prison violence.  Chapter Three, the Methods section, specifies the research 
questions and main hypotheses, describes the data sources, and outlines the design and 
methodology of the study.  Chapter Four presents the main results, which include descriptive 
statistics of prison violence and its correlates and the results of the negative binomial regression 
analyses.  Finally, the dissertation concludes with Chapter Five, which includes a description of 
the study’s possibilities and limitations, some suggestions for further research, and implications 
for policy and practice.   
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Chapter II 
Literature Review  
2.1 Theories of prison violence 
What causes prison violence? What are its specific characteristics inside prison walls? 
Scholars have tried to answer these questions by proposing different explanations. In this section 
I provide an introduction for six different explanations of prison violence, whereas my research 
study will focus on three of the major theoretical perspectives that have been used to explain 
prison violence, namely the deprivation, importation, and administrative-control models.  
Although much of the literature has presented these models as competing theories, my approach 
to the study of prison violence assumes that these different models illuminate different aspects of 
the phenomenon and that they all can contribute to enhancing our understanding of prison 
violence. 
A) The deprivation model                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
With its original formulation found in the seminal work of Clemmer (1940), the 
deprivation model states that prison violence occurs as the result of an adaptive response to the 
strains of the restricted institutional life experienced by inmates.  Indeed, Clemmer described the 
process of prisonization that an inmate experiences as an adaptive process that occurs when 
entering prison.  According to Clemmer, “the inmate must adopt in greater or lesser degree the 
folkways, mores, customs, and general culture of the penitentiary” (p.  299). He also presented a 
rich description of the social relations and hierarchies that take place in prisons, which vary 
according to the type of crime and other symbols of status. 
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Later, in The Society of Captives, Sykes (1958) described in great detail “the pains of 
imprisonment”; inmates suffer a variety of deprivations when entering prison, including the loss 
of freedom of movement, goods and services, heterosexual relationships, autonomy, and 
security.  Inmates’ misconduct reflects the adaptive responses to those losses.  In particular, 
inmates form a subculture in response to such deprivations, with its own argot, inmate code, 
roles, and values.  Deprivation theorists argue, too, that the subculture formed in response, with 
its negative attitudes, values, and self-concepts, develops in permanent opposition to the 
administration and staff (Paterline & Petersen, 1999; Sykes & Messinger, 1960; Thomas, 1977).  
These theorists thus assert that the stressful and oppressive conditions within prison walls carry 
the ultimate responsibility for prison violence (Cao et al., 1997; Wright, 1991).  In sum, 
deprivation theory assigns the explanation for prison violence to the oppressive conditions of 
confinement and confinement facilities and thus places the roots of prison violence beyond 
inmates’ characteristics.   
Consequently, the following indicators have been considered as falling under the 
deprivation hypothesis: the security level of the facility, the level of prison crowding, the total 
inmate population, the visitation patterns, the inmates’ perceived “pains of imprisonment,” and 
sentence length.  All of these factors have been recognized in the literature as indicators of 
deprivation (Rocheleau, 2013; Gaes, 1994; Cooley, 1993; Goodstein & Wright, 1989; McCorkle, 
Miethe, & Drass, 1995; Farrington & Nuttall, 1980). 
B) The administrative-control model  
The administrative-control model (also called “the prison management model”) assumes 
that prison officials and administrators—since they are to a great extent those who run the 
prisons—are determinant actors that influence prison outcomes and inmate behavior including, 
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of course, misconduct and violence (Di Iulio, 1987; Reisig, 2002).  Proponents of this model 
maintain that failures in prison management have been associated with severe forms of inmate 
violence, including inmate-inmate aggression, inmate homicides, or collective riots (DiIulio, 
1987; Reisig, 2002; Snacken, 2005; Sparks et al., 1996; Useem & Kimball, 1989).  Research has 
also shown that the managerial style of prison administrators and officers is a good predictor of 
job satisfaction and role strain among correctional staff (Reisig & Lovrich 1998; Stohr et al.  
1994), which would mediate, in turn, in-prison inmates’ outcomes such as violence and 
misconduct in general (Craig, 2004).   
Indicators that have been employed under the administrative-control model include staff 
turnover, the use of coercive controls, the use of remunerative controls, the participation of 
inmates in work-based programs, the use of administrative segregation or solitary confinement, 
and the overall management/administrative style of the prison, and any aspect overall that might 
be related to decision-making processes, whether administrative or leadership-related (Di Iulio, 
1987; Reisig, 1998; Reisig, 2002; Huebner, 2003; Craig, 2004; Steiner, 2009).   
Nevertheless, this model has been received with criticism.  Despite the fact that prison 
management and practices have been linked to a variety of prison outcomes, including prison 
violence, prison management does not mechanically influence violence because other factors—
such as the type of facility, its level of security and overcrowding—must be considered (Martin, 
Lichtenstein, Jenkot & Forde, 2012; Huey & Mcnulty, 2005). It is also important to consider the 
fact that individual characteristics of inmates (Goodstein & Wright, 1989; Tewksbury & 
Mustaine, 2008; Moster & Jeglic, 2009) may mediate the relationship between prison 
management and prison violence.   
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C) The importation model 
The importation model, on the other hand, argues that inmates do not arrive in prison in 
order to be molded by the correctional institution in a vacuum.  According to this theory, the 
inmates’ organization and behavior reflect the values and social patterns that offenders bring 
with them into the prison.  In other words, prison violence would be the result of pre-prison 
experiences and socialization processes, as inmates’ socio-cultural backgrounds and individual 
attributes will largely determine their behavior while incarcerated (Irwin & Cressey, 1962; Irwin, 
1981).  Jacobs’ Statesville (1977) challenged Sykes’ traditional explanation for inmates’ 
adaptations by maintaining that instead of responding to the deprivations of prison life, inmates 
import values, modes of thinking, and behavior based on outside patterns.  As a result, there is no 
single “society of captives,” but rather a variety of value systems within different sub-groups, 
usually ethnically-defined gangs.  In this case, the modes by which inmates adapt to prison life 
would result not from the losses they experience while incarcerated but instead from what is 
brought into the prison from outside.  Therefore, the subcultural aspects of prison correspond to 
those in the community (Irwin & Cressey, 1962).  In addition, the experiences of pain and 
deprivation caused by imprisonment would not be equally experienced by every inmate, as each 
would exhibit differential abilities to meet his needs in prison (Bonta & Gendreau, 1990; Bukstel 
& Kilmann, 1980; Seymour, 1977; Toch, 1977).  Those differential abilities would certainly 
include a differential capacity for the use of force and violence.  Finally, the idea of a unified 
“society of captives” (Sykes, 1958) becomes problematic, since inmates would not constitute a 
homogeneous group, but rather many subgroups with different belief systems and norms 
(Carroll, 1974; Irwin & Cressey, 1962; Jacobs, 1977; Wooldredge, 1991; Crewe, 2005; Irwin, 
2005). 
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Scholarly literature on the importation model has tended to include individual-level 
inmate variables, such as race, sex, age, social class, marital status, education, previous 
convictions, employment, type of crime committed, gang membership, substance abuse, and 
personality variables (i.e.  Goodstein & Wright, 1989; Wooldredge, 1991; Wright, 1991; De Lisi, 
2003; Drury & De Lisi, 2010; Berg & De Lisi, 2006; Harer & Steffensmeier, 1996; Kuanliang & 
Sorensen, 2008).   
In sum, three perspectives on prison violence have been introduced in the previous pages, 
namely the deprivation, the importation, and the administrative-control models of prison 
violence.  The deprivation model argues that the main cause of violence has to do with the 
oppressive and stressful prison environment in which inmates are forced to live, where they face 
a variety of pains and deprivations.  The importation model, on the other hand, assigns the 
explanation for prison violence to the inmates’ pre-prison experiences and to the individual 
repertoire of characteristics that inmates bring into the prison.  Finally, the administrative-control 
model maintains that violence occurs as a result of inadequate “prison government” by officers 
and administrators and that leadership and control are key elements for maintaining orderly 
prisons.  More recent developments that have studied prisons as organizational units have 
identified certain variables as influential in promoting or decreasing violence, such as prison 
culture, staff burnout, or staff beliefs/ideology.   
 In the next section, the Literature Review, I present and critically analyze empirical 
findings on prison violence based on studies that have relied on the three approaches just 
described (deprivation, importation, administrative-control).  The objective here is to present 
what we empirically know about each theory, as well as some of the research gaps in the 
literature, in order to frame my own dissertation enterprise and my main research questions.   
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2.2 Literature Review: Empirical Findings on Prison Violence 
Part of the literature review in this section is based on a study by Gadon, Johnstone and 
Cook (2006) that conducted a systematic review of the literature on situational variables and 
institutional violence.  Gadon, Johnstone and Cook identified 21 studies on prison violence,4 and 
their work represents a valuable contribution not only for their analysis of the literature, but also 
for the range of situational variables (including compositional, management-related, spatial-
temporal, and program-related variables) they analyzed.  Their study has broadened the spectrum 
of contextual influences that can be relevant for prison violence.  Indeed, they criticized the fact 
that much of the research on prison violence was focused on “person-centered explanations” (p.  
515), and their work highlights the ways in which prison violence occurs within a social context.   
Evidence for the Deprivation Theory 
• Prison characteristics and violence 
Findings regarding prison size revealed inconsistent results.  On the one hand, Farrington 
and Nuttall (1980) concluded that there were no statistically significant differences in assault 
rates for small and large prisons.  On the other hand, McCorkle et al. (1995) found that larger 
institutions (those holding a larger daily population) showed higher staff assault rates, yet larger 
prisons also reported lower levels of prisoner–prisoner assaults.  Atlas (1982) found a trend for 
physical and sexual assaults occurring in areas of little or no supervision.   
4 Out of the studies, 16 considered sole physical assaults as the main outcome; 2 included physical, verbal and 
sexual assaults, and 1 considered physical and sexual assaults as the outcome of interest.  In two studies, the type of 
assault was not specified.  In terms of the type of the perpetrators, 8 out of the 21 studies analyzed both prisoner–
prisoner violence and prisoner–staff assaults.  Six of them studied prisoner–staff violence, and in 4 articles, 
prisoner–prisoner violence was examined.  Three of the studies did not explicitly mention who was involved in the 
incident.  The vast majority of them (20/21) employed a quantitative approach.  Authors grouped the situational 
variables into eight categories: (1) structure-related, (2) staff characteristics, (3) temporal factors (e.g., when the 
incident took place), (4) location, (5) level of crowding, (6) management, (7) program availability and (8) ward/unit 
features.   
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In terms of the location where violence takes place in prisons, Steinke (1991) found a 
relationship between prisoner–prisoner assaults and local job or school appointment sites, dorms, 
corridors, shower areas, dining, recreational areas, residential areas, and observation units.  
When homicides were considered, Porporino and colleagues (1987) found that most homicides 
(45%) happened in an inmate’s cell, whereas Jayewardene and Doherty (1985) found that 
prisoners were killed in all parts of an institution except workshops.   
With regard to overcrowding, only one study (Lester, 1990) found a significant 
relationship between crowding and institutional violence, whereas other authors (Ekland-Olson, 
1986; Jan, 1980; Nacci et al., 1977) found non-significant relationships.  Nevertheless, it is 
important to recall that research on crowding and violence might be affected by conceptual and 
operational inconsistencies across studies (Bonta & Gendreau, 1990; Gaes, 1994).   
Regarding temporal aspects, one study found no significant differences between monthly 
rates of violent incidents when physical or verbal prisoner–staff assaults were examined (Bidna, 
1975).  On the other hand, differences were found when homicide rates were examined by 
season, with more murders taking place in the autumn and summer months (Porporino et al., 
1987).  At the same time, two studies (Jayewardene & Doherty, 1985; Porporino et al., 1987) 
found that higher rates of homicides and violent incidents occurred on a Friday, Saturday, and 
Sunday, suggesting that higher risk could be related to times of reduced activities. 
• Overcrowding 
In a study that tried to separate the effects of prison size on prison violence and 
reconviction, Farrington and Nuttall (1980) found that factors other than size per se could 
account for variations in violence and recidivism.  Indeed, after controls, they found that 
overcrowding was a more important predictor of prison violence than prison size.  However, this 
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study did not include individual-related variables as controls, and thus there was no chance to 
potentially consider an alternative explanation, such as the importation hypothesis, for example. 
Some years later, Gaes and McGuire (1985) analyzed the influence of crowding on prison 
violence and found that out of four dependent variables analyzed (different types of assault), 
three of them were positively related to a crowding composite score and that overcrowding was 
the most important variable in determining assault rates at the aggregate level.  After Gaes and 
McGuire, other studies have addressed this issue with mixed evidence.  On the one hand, Austin 
and Irwin (2001), Bonta and Gendreau (1990), Lester (1990), and Spector (2010) have reported 
increased prison violence when crowding increases.  Other researchers, such as DiIulio (1990), 
Ekland-Olsen (1986), Gaes (1994) or Reisig (1998), have argued that violence can be better 
predicted by looking at poor management and lack of officer training.  Wooldredge and Steiner 
(2009) explained such inconsistencies in terms of different definitions of overcrowding that were 
being used in the literature (as a ratio between total population and design capacity; as a total raw 
population; and as a ratio plus a count of the total population) and pointed out the importance of 
clarifying definitions of overcrowding and acquiring more consistency in future research.   
• Security level of the facility 
In terms of structure-related variables, findings revealed that violent assaults (including 
inmate homicides) were more likely to happen in maximum or high-security settings 
(Jayewardene & Doherty, 1985; McCorkle et al., 1995; Porporino et al., 1987; Kratcoski, 1988).  
More recently, a longitudinal study by Steiner (2009) found that a higher proportion of inmates 
in high-security custody was significantly associated with higher levels of violence, both cross-
sectionally and longitudinally.   
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In addition, Briggs, Sundt and Castellano (2003) evaluated the extent to which supermax 
prisons5 had diminished prison violence, finding no empirical support for the association 
between supermax prisons and the aggregate levels of inmate-inmate violence.  At the same 
time, the idea that supermax prisons improved staff safety showed mixed results: no effect was 
found on levels of inmate-staff assaults in Minnesota; there were increased staff injuries in 
Arizona and decreased assaults in Illinois.  The authors concluded that supermax prisons do not 
seem to be the best alternative for controlling inmate violence, highlighting instead that 
alternative courses of action should be considered, such as administrative segregation, solitary 
confinement or even cognitive-behavioral therapies.  In an updated version of that study, Sundt, 
Castellano, and Briggs (2014) analyzed the influence of opening a supermax facility in the state 
of Illinois on the reduction of violence; they found no empirical association between its opening 
and the rate of inmate-on-inmate assaults, although there was an observed reduction in inmate-
staff assaults and in the number of days that inmates were in solitary confinement. 
• Inmates’ perception of prison environment  
Hochstetler and De Lisi (2005) found that inmates’ perception of the prison environment 
(mainly through boredom, noise, and lack of privacy) had an effect on prison violence through 
both witnessing victimization and through inmate’s participation in the informal economy.  More 
recently, Rocheleau (2013), using a set of operational indicators based on Sykes’ (1958) original 
work, conducted a survey among inmates on prison conditions and other “pains of 
imprisonment.” This study found that “boredom” was associated with prison violence, 
highlighting “the irony of confinement”: experiencing more of the pains of imprisonment 
actually degrades and disadvantages individuals’ capacities for rehabilitation. 
5 The so-called supermax prisons or “supermax” have been defined as maximum-security facilities usually oriented 
toward housing the most dangerous individuals in a highly restricted regime.  (Pizarro & Narag, 2008)  
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• Sentence Length 
Sentence length and time served and their relationship to violence offer mixed results.  
On the one hand, a positive association between sentence length and prison violence has been 
observed (Drury and De Lisi, 2010); Dhami, Ayton and Loewenstein (2007) found that there 
were direct effects of time spent in prison (current sentence) on inmates’ misconduct in prison.  
On the other hand, Cunningham and Sorensen (2007) found that sentence length was negatively 
associated with institutional violence.  Some years later, the same authors (Sorensen & 
Cunningham, 2010), in a study in Florida, found similar evidence and noted that sentence length 
was negatively associated with probability of committing violent acts.   
• Conflict with guards  
In a recent study, Rocheleau (2013) assessed the relationship between a contemporary 
version of Sykes’ “pains of imprisonment” and prison violence and found a positive association 
between conflicts with staff and prison violence, as well between inmates having concerns about 
their safety and violent misconduct 
Evidence for the Administrative-Control Theory  
In an article by Cook, Wosniak, and Johnstone (2008), the authors argued in favor of 
considering the situational context where violence takes place and criticized what they consider 
an excessive focus on individual-risk assessment, which has overlooked the situational 
components of violence behind bars.  They reason that “violent prisoners are only violent in 
certain circumstances” and that we need “to understand not only the origins of violence in prison 
but also the situational contexts in which violence occurs” (p.1065).   
• Program access 
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In terms of program availability for inmates, findings showed that a higher proportion of 
prisoners working in programs relating to education, vocational training, or industry was 
associated with lower rates of prisoner–staff assaults (McCorkle et al., 1995; Walrath, 2001).  
Similarly, prisoners who train to serve as workshop leaders for other prisoners reported fewer 
prisoner–prisoner fights than their prisoners who did not take part in the program (Walrath, 
2001). 
In the same vein, lower levels of violence were associated with the use of remunerative 
controls rather than coercive ones (Huebner, 2003).  Similarly, in a two-wave, longitudinal study, 
Steiner (2009) found that a higher proportion of working inmates was associated with decreasing 
violence, in both the cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses.   
• Coercive-based control measures 
By employing nationally representative survey data, Huebner (2003) tested the 
administrative-control model for explaining prison violence by contrasting, specifically, the role 
of remunerative versus coercive forms of controls.  His findings revealed that remunerative 
controls were important for reducing inmate-staff violence and that coercive controls were not 
significant to explaining any form of violence, in opposition to what Di Iulio had stated almost 
twenty years ago (1987). 
• Conjugal visitation programs 
Hensley, Koscheski, and Tewksbury (2002) examined the relationship between 
participation in conjugal visitation programs and violent behavior in two prisons in Mississippi.  
They surveyed 256 incarcerated men and women regarding institutional violence and 
participation in the conjugal visitation program.  Only inmates housed in a minimum or medium 
security unit are permitted to participate in these visits, and conjugal visits must be earned 
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through good behavior.  Findings showed that inmates who engaged in conjugal visits had no 
significant differences in terms of engaging in violent behavior or threats of violence than those 
who did not participate in the conjugal visitation program.   
• Effective leadership 
Fleisher (1989), in a unique research study, conducted a participant observation at the 
Federal Penitentiary at Lompoc, California, after receiving training as a prison officer for one 
year.  The author found that violence was reduced at Lompoc as a result of the creation and 
maintenance of an environment that rewarded non-violent behavior among inmates.  A critical 
role in this successful story was played by a for-profit prison factory that helped inmates obtain 
sources of income and, thus, improve their material conditions.  The author posits that despite the 
fact that Lompoc housed violent offenders, an effective leadership was able to run a prison where 
violence was prevented.  Other studies after Flesher’s that focused on leadership and 
organizational aspects have found that poor prison management or highly formalized managerial 
practices were positively associated with prison violence (McCorkle et al., 1995; Reisig, 1998, 
2002). 
Kimmet and Martin (2002) interviewed 209 inmates and maintained that violence is a 
response for surviving the risk of exploitation, an ever-present threat derived from the prison 
culture.  They found that most violent situations in prisons had to do with non-material interests, 
such as respect, fairness, loyalty, and honor.  In addition, the authors described in rich detail the 
most common manifestations of violence (accusation or threats, verbal challenges, invasion of 
space, and insults) and how they related to inmates’ social structure, interests, power balance, 
and fight catalysts.  Finally, they identified a variety of management-related factors that 
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prevented or minimized violence: prior good relations between parties, privileges that inmates 
wanted to retain, and officers prioritizing conflict prevention. 
• Prison culture  
Prison culture has been found to be influential in generating organizational failures such 
as ethical violations or increased levels of violence within prison settings (Jung et al., 2009; 
Carrol, 2007; Liebling, 2004).  For example, a prison environment that rewards violent behavior 
from guards has been associated with more violence among inmates. 
• Staff ideologies 
Some studies conducted on staff attitudes, beliefs, and orientations toward their work 
have shown their importance for prisons’ daily operations and general management (Cullen et 
al., 1989; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2008).  Indeed, the prison staff’s prevailing ideologies and 
how they give meaning to their own work can influence outcomes such as staff interactions with 
inmates, encouragement of various forms of behavior by inmates, and the way inmates may think 
about the future, which can, in turn, create predispositions to violence.   
• Burnout of prison staff 
The burnout of prison staff has been linked to the development of violence in correctional 
settings.  The concept of “job burnout” refers to being psychologically worn out and exhausted 
from the job, which usually takes place when employees experience a gradual loss of caring 
about the people with whom they work (Freudenberger, 1974; Maslach, 1978).  Job burnout has 
severe consequences for staff members (Dollard & Winefield, 2001; Neveu, 2007), for their 
relationship with inmates (Garner, Knight, & Simpson, 2007; Maslach, Schaufeli, & Leiter, 
2001) and for the overall functioning of the facility (Carlson & Thomas, 2006; Garland, 2002; 
Neveu, 2007; Schaufeli & Peeters, 2000; Maslach et al., 2001).   
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• Staff characteristics 
When staff characteristics and their relationship to violence were examined, no 
relationship was found between staff age and likelihood of assault (Davies & Burgess, 1988; 
Kratcoski, 1988).  On the other hand, studies have found that staff experience and assault rates 
are related.  Indeed, Davies and Burgess (1988) found that staff experience was inversely 
associated with assaults, which coincides with Kratcoski (1988) and Walter’s (1998) 
observations in terms of less experienced officers being more prone to experiencing assaults.   
In a longitudinal analysis that employed facility-level data from the 1995 and 2000 
Census of State and Federal Adult Correctional Facilities, Steiner (2009) studied both inmate-on-
inmate violence as well as collective violence and found that facilities with more racial 
heterogeneity (between inmates and staff) and a higher ratio of inmates to guards were positively 
associated with violence. 
In terms of staff training, Kimmet and Martin (2002) found that when staff members 
were trained to recognize and manage conflict through resolution programs prison violence could 
be prevented or reduced.   
Evidence for the Importation Theory 
• Age  
In the literature, there is vast agreement that an inmate’s age is negatively related to 
prison violence: younger inmates show higher levels of violent misconduct (Ekland-Olson et al., 
1983; Malbi et al., 1979; Cao, Zhao & Van Dine, 1997; Kuanliang & Sorensen, 2008; Lahm, 
2009; De Lissi et al., 2010; Sorensen & Cunningham, 2010; Arbach-Lucioni, Martinez-García & 
Andrés-Pueyo, 2012).  Nevertheless, after assessing a variety of individual-level variables as 
predictors of violent misconduct among inmates in close custody, Cunningham and Sorensen 
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(2007) found that individual-level variables only modestly predicted different forms of 
misconduct (area under the curve between .72 and .74) and suggested that a broader set of 
indicators should be employed.   
• Marital status 
In the literature that was reviewed, there was not much information in this regard, 
although Kuanliang and Sorensen (2008) found that being married would be negatively 
associated with prison violence. 
• Race and ethnicity 
In terms of race and ethnicity and their relationship with prison violence, research 
findings show that, in general, non-white inmates were more likely to engage in violent 
misconduct in prisons.  For example, Harer and Steffensmeier (1996) analyzed federal prison 
data from 58 facilities to evaluate whether there were racial differences in violent misconduct 
and found that black inmates had higher rates of violent behavior.  In the same vein, Cao, Zhao, 
and Van Dine (1997) found that non-white inmates were more likely to get involved in prison 
misconduct in Ohio prisons, and De Lisi, Berg, and Hochstetler (2004) found that minorities 
were at higher risk of engaging in violent misconduct.  Similarly, Lahm (2009) applied a 
multilevel analysis to study inmate-staff assaults and found that, when facility-level effects were 
considered, a larger proportion of non-White inmates were predictors of assault toward staff 
members, in line with Steiner’s study (2009) that found that prisons with higher proportions of 
African American inmates had more violence.   
Berg and De Lisi (2006) analyzed the specific role of racial, ethnic and citizenship-
related variables with regard to prison violence.  They employed administrative data from the 
“offender classification system” and, after controlling for other relevant variables, found that 
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among males, those relatively more involved in violence were Hispanics and Native American 
and that among women, African Americans and Native Americans were more involved in 
violence.  Citizenship was not predictive of prison violence. 
• Sex 
Most studies have found that being male is positively associated with prison violence 
(Kuanliang & Sorensen, 2008; Sorensen & Cunningham, 2010; Berg & DeLisi, 2006; Craddock, 
1996; Gover et al., 2008; Harer & Langan, 2001; Jiang, 2005).  Only one study found in the 
opposite direction (Cao, Zhao & Van Dine, 1997), showing that being female was positively 
associated with obtaining a disciplinary ticket for prison misconduct in Ohio prisons. 
• Educational level 
The review found only one study addressing educational level and prison violence.  The 
work of Cao, Zhao, and Van Dine (1997) showed that education level was negatively related to 
prison violence.   
• History of prison violence 
In terms of the association of previous history of violence and current violent behavior, 
research findings have shown that, in general, having a history of violence is a good predictor of 
current violent behavior in prison, either under normal custodial regimes (De Lisi, Berg, & 
Hochstetler, 2004; De Lissi et al., 2010; Arbach-Lucioni, Martinez-García & Andrés-Pueyo, 
2012) or among inmates in close custody (Cunningham & Sorensen, 2007).  Moreover, Drury 
and De Lissi (2010) found that among a variety of other predictors, previous prison misconduct 
and institutional adjustment were the most important predictors for current violent misconduct.   
• Previous conviction 
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In general, many authors have found that prior confinement is positively associated with 
prison violence (De Lisi, Berg, & Hochstetler, 2004; Cunningham & Sorensen, 2007; Kuanliang 
& Sorensen, 2008; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2008; Sorensen & Cunningham, 2010), yet some have 
argued that the specific link between the two would be the prior adjustment, rather than having 
served a prior term in itself (Drury & De Lisi, 2010).   
• Type of crime for current sentence 
Sorensen and Cunningham (2010) analyzed administrative data from the Florida 
Department of Corrections to test whether those who had committed serious crimes were also 
more prone to committing violent acts in prison.  They found that inmates convicted for murder 
were not more likely to get involved in disciplinary infractions, including violent misbehavior.   
• Substance abuse 
When the relationship between substance abuse and prison violence was examined, 
findings show that in general, both were positively associated, even when other variables were 
controlled.  For example, Kuanliang and Sorensen (2008) found that rule violations were 
positively associated with substance abuse.  Byrne and Hummer (2007) found an association 
between drug abuse and violence, estimating that about 23% of those who have reported a 
history of physical abuse in prison were substance abusers (versus 15% of substance abusers who 
had no history of violence). De Lissi et al. (2010) found that substance abuse was positively 
related to higher levels of misconduct.  Arbach-Lucioni, Martinez-García, and Andrés-Pueyo 
(2012), who analyzed official data on violent misconduct in Cataluña, found that having drug 
and/or alcohol problems were factors positively linked to prison violence.   
 
• Gang affiliation  
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In general terms, gang affiliation and prison violence have been found to be positively 
related variables.  Byrne and Hummer (2007) analyzed prison violence and its correlates and 
found significant differences between those involved and their gang activity.  Similarly, 
Cunningham and Sorensen (2007) found that gang affiliation was positively linked to violence 
behind bars.  The same authors (Sorensen & Cunningham, 2010) found that gang membership 
(suspected or confirmed) was positively associated with prison violence.  Nevertheless, De Lisi, 
Berg, and Hochstetler (2004) explored the extent to which male inmates with high gang 
involvement were more prone to engaging in prison violence.  Based on official administrative 
data on individuals from one southwestern state in the U.S., they found that gang variables 
significantly accounted for prison violence only in a full model.  In addition, they found that, 
comparatively speaking, gang membership had a smaller effect than some other importation 
factors. 
• Past victimization/trauma 
Research on past victimization, trauma, and current prison violence was relatively scarce.  
Nevertheless, some research has linked having experienced physical abuse in the past with prison 
violence (Kuanliang & Sorensen, 2008) or having suffered traumatization or neglect during 
childhood and current institutional misconduct (De Lissi et al., 2010).   
• Psychological variables 
A variety of studies have started to incorporate the assessment of inmates in terms of 
some psychological or psychiatric personality-related variables and their association with prison 
violence.   
- Aggression 
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Lahm (2009) found a positive relationship between aggression (assessed through 
different psychological instruments) and prison violence.  In addition, De Lissi et al. (2010) 
studied the impact of traumatization on institutional misconduct among a sample of juvenile 
delinquents in confinement and included a variety of psychiatric variables (assessed through the 
application of psychometric instruments) to assess the association between traumatization and 
misconduct; the researchers found that aggression was an important, individual-level predictor.   
- Self-control 
Hochstetler and De Lisi (2005) assessed the relationship among inmate characteristics, 
including inmates’ self-control, and found that self-control had an effect on prison violence 
through both witnessing victimization and through inmate’s participation in the informal 
economy 
- Antisocial attitudes 
Hochstetler and De Lisi (2005) included in their study the effect of inmates’ attitudes to 
prison violence and found that antisocial attitudes were mediators of prison violence.  In 
addition, Arbach-Lucioni, Martinez-García, and Andrés-Pueyo (2012) found a positive 
association between antisocial attitudes and prison violence among inmates in Cataluña, Spain.   
- Mental health 
Kuanliang and Sorensen (2008) analyzed inmate characteristics to determine which traits 
could be associated with disciplinary infractions.  They analyzed data from the 1997 Survey of 
Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities and found that rule violations were positively 
associated with having mental health problems 
- Response to treatment  
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Arbach-Lucioni, Martinez-García and Andrés-Pueyo (2012) found that inmates who 
responded to psychological/psychiatric treatment were found to be negatively associated with 
violent misconduct 
• Family and community characteristics 
Despite the variety of articles that exist on the cycle of incarceration in families, only the 
study by Kuanliang and Sorensen (2008) showed that rule violations were positively associated 
with the incarceration of a family member.   
Prison Violence in Latin America  
 Dammert and Zúñiga (2008) analyzed prison systems in Latin America and compiled 
some of the scant data available on prison violence in different countries.  They found that most 
prison systems in the region suggested a prolonged abandonment by the state, which was evident 
in the levels of prison crowding (no country had less than 10% overcrowding, and most of them 
had severe prison overcrowding), in the low investment in prison personnel, in the inhumane 
living conditions that inmates face inside prisons, in the precarious prison infrastructure, and in 
scarce access to basic services and rehabilitation programs. 
 At the same time, the authors noticed that both zero-tolerance and tough-on-crime types 
of policies were being applied in the region, resulting in more individuals receiving prison terms 
and serving longer sentences.  The added volume of prisoners put additional pressure on prison 
systems already overwhelmed and, as a result, overcrowding, inmate-on-inmate violence, hunger 
strikes, and even riots started increasing (Dammert & Zúñiga, 2008). 
In terms of the magnitude of prison violence in Latin American countries, Dammert and 
Zúñiga experienced difficulty finding complete and reliable information that allowed them to 
explore the magnitude and evolution of the phenomenon.  Nevertheless, some data showed that 
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Venezuela is one of the countries with higher levels of prison violence in the region, with more 
than one inmate dead daily; this high level of violence can be associated with the use of firearms 
inside prisons (often with the complicity of prison guards), with the absence of educational or 
other rehabilitative programs, and with the overall lack of control in many establishments 
(Dammert & Zuñiga, 2008, p.114).   
The Brazilian case also presented incomplete information, but some data revealed that 
there were around 1,000 individual deaths per year.  Prisons in Brazil have been affected for a 
long time by violent episodes, abuses, and torture by guards of inmates (Salla, Rodríguez, 
Espinoza y Litvachky, 2008).6  More recently, it has been documented that this prolonged 
abandonment of the prisons by the state has resulted in the unification and strengthening of 
criminal organizations inside prisons as they offer inmates a sense of identity, belonging, and 
social organization.  The appeal of these organizations in these types of prison climates has also 
resulted in stronger criminal organizations such as the “Primeiro Comando da Capital” (First 
Command of the Capital), which is currently believed to operate even outside prison facilities 
and to be responsible for dozens of assassinations and other coordinated attacks (Dias, 2011; 
Teixeira, 2012). 
The Argentinian case, on the other hand, despite the fact that it does not have updated 
official data on dead or injured individuals, has shown that there are many inmates having 
suffered physical violence from guards, yet the exact figures are unknown. Moreover, studies 
show that in Argentinian prisons, institutional violence by agents of the state and even torture 
would be common realities (Salla, Rodríguez, Espinoza y Litvachky, 2008).  Nevertheless, in all 
the examples that Dammert and Zuniga presented, there was no empirical evidence with regard 
6 The most infamous, iconic case of brutality is known as the Carandiru Prison Massacre, which took place in São 
Paulo in 1992 
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to the causes of prison violence, beyond hypothesis or references to overcrowding.  Isla and 
Miguez (2003) found evidence in Argentina that suggests a correlation between poor prison 
conditions and dysfunctional adaptation that inmates experience and a poor prison administration 
system.  The poor administration is particularly evident with regard to high personnel 
absenteeism, low skill repertoires of prison workers (managers and wardens alike), and a 
dramatic lack conflict resolution tools.  This research, though limited to a few prisons in 
Argentina, highlights the importance of attending to guard-related variables for an appropriate 
understanding and management of prison outcomes, including violence.  In the same vein, 
Alzúa, Rodríguez, and Villa (2010) found evidence that educational programs reduced prison 
violence in different regions of Argentina, since education programs could change inmates’ 
values and orientations or might have an effect simply as a result of having less useless time. 
Finally, Morris (2008) conducted an exploratory study in Jamaica and analyzed how 
inmates experienced and responded to a disadvantaged prison environment.   He found support 
for both the deprivation and importation theories of prison violence; his findings suggest that 
individual characteristics (gender, citizenship), pre-prison experiences (relatives in prison or 
not), personal convictions, and prison-specific factors (deprivation conditions, overcrowding, 
mistreatment by guards and daily violence) did play a role in inmates’ adaptation.  In addition, he 
found that theoretical constructs in penology (importation and deprivation theories of prison 
violence) were reasonably applicable to the Jamaican context and that there were variations 
among establishments in terms of the environments they created for inmates. 
2.3 Some gaps in the literature on prison violence 
• Lack of studies in developing countries and prisons overlooked in Latin America 
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A large body of literature has studied prison violence, especially in developed countries 
such as the United States, The United Kingdom, Finland, Canada, Australia or the Netherlands.  
With some exceptions, research on prison violence is rare in developing countries (Gendreau, 
Goggin, & Law, 1997; Wright & Cingranelli, 1985).   
Research on prisons in developing countries has shown that most prison systems in these 
countries are highly overcrowded, deficient in terms of humane conditions and program access, 
and filled with poor managerial practices, including mistreatment or even torture (Wright & 
Cingranelli, 1985; Stern, 1990; Wright & Cingranelli, 1985; Lindegaar & Gear, 2014; Dammert 
& Zuniga, 2008; Espinoza & Martinez, 2007; Isla and Miguez, 2003; INDH, 2012).  
Nevertheless, little systematic research has been conducted on the topic of prison violence or any 
of its correlates. 
• Importation theory receiving increasing attention in recent years 
 In organizing the literature review in chronological order, it became apparent to me that 
the importation theory has received more attention, along with an increasing interest for 
improving the classification of inmates according to their risk of violence, in more recent years.  
The other two approaches, both the deprivation and the administrative-control model of prison 
violence, have not appeared as frequently as the importation theory, which may reflect an 
underlying, implicit assumption that individuals are to be blamed for violence behind bars with 
preeminence over other explanations.  Often, this assumption is supported by media portrayals of 
prisons that focus on violence led by “violent inmates.”   
• A great portion of the literature motivated by “classification purposes”  
 The collection of data only with the goal of categorizing inmates according to their “risk” 
of engaging in prison violence may result in atheoretical approaches to the question of why 
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prison violence occurs. In contrast, looking beyond classification offers researchers and 
administrators the possibility of interpreting results in ways that lead to the development of new 
theories and theoretical approaches that may also serve to enrich our understanding of the world. 
Secondly, with the use of a classification focus, prison violence could be exclusively attributed to 
individuals’ characteristics (Cook, Wosniak & Johnstone, 2008). As suggested by Cunningham 
and Sorensen (2007), it is important to expand the analysis toward including contextual 
variables. 
• Few studies testing different models all together 
 Among the reviewed literature, few studies have incorporated the study of two or more 
perspectives on prison violence.  Some studies have considered the deprivation model along with 
the importation hypothesis; others have considered the deprivation and administrative-control 
models of prison violence (Huebner, 2003; Lahm, 2009) Testing different theories all together is 
important to promoting prison reform, as this enterprise has much to do with the prison structure 
and leadership (Coyle, 2003) rather than the sole consideration of inmates’ background 
characteristics, many of which are not subject to change.  Indeed, administrators and 
policymakers cannot do much with regard to inmate characteristics, since they can do little more 
than obey and manage what the Courts’ decisions regarding sentenced individuals.  On the other 
hand, prison conditions (deprivation conditions) and officers’ decision-making and leadership 
attributes (administrative-control model) can be enhanced not only to reduce prison violence but 
also to create a supportive environment for inmates’ treatment overall (Liebling, 2004). 
• Predominant use of administrative records 
 From the literature review, it is clear that most of the current research relies on 
administrative and official records of misconduct.  Since official records usually contain 
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information collected for administrative purposes, they have some limitations for research 
purposes, such as the lack of control for the researcher over content, the use of administrative 
definitions that may even vary over time, the variety of quality issues (missing or erroneous data, 
information not updated), or the lack of contextual information in the administrative records 
(Smith et al., 2004).  Only a few studies use combinations of data (Rocheleau, 2013; Hochstetler 
& De Lisi, 2005).  Most studies that have tested the deprivation hypothesis have employed 
indicators of the prison’s level of security or overcrowding indexes, but only few of them have 
incorporated some indicators of inmates’ perceptions of the conditions of confinement, with rare 
exceptions (Rocheleau, 2013).   
2.4 The Current Study  
Some of the gaps in prior research on prison violence, then, have to do with the lack of 
research on prison violence in developing countries (particularly in light of very severe 
overcrowding conditions that characterize prison systems there), the predominant use of 
administrative data in testing violent misconduct in prisons (which are not even available or are 
not reliable in many developing nations), the emphasis on “violent inmates,” the need to improve 
the classification systems for prison violence, and the lack of national-level data to test more than 
two theoretical approaches. 
My current research project will try to fill part of this knowledge gap by addressing some 
of the aforementioned gaps in the study of prison violence: i) it will empirically test three 
approaches, namely the deprivation, the importation, and the administrative-control models; ii) it 
will employ a combination of data sources, including administrative records and survey data; and 
iii) it will undertake the study of prison violence in a developing country, and in so doing, it will 
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take into account a context with high overcrowding levels, an overall deteriorated infrastructure, 
and ratios of inmates/guards that in many cases are more than 100/1. 
Despite the fact that Chile has one of the highest incarceration rates in the Americas, with 
267 inmates per 100,000 inhabitants (ICPS, 2013), to date there is no systematic information on 
prison violence for the entire prison system beyond anecdotal evidence or officers’ claimed 
expertise.  Thus, the main goal of this research is to investigate the correlates of prison violence 
in Chilean facilities.  I do so by employing a combination of administrative data (at the facility 
level) and aggregate survey results (at the facility level, as well) during the 2012 calendar year in 
order to empirically test the deprivation, the importation and the administrative-control theories.  
By conducting the first systematic study on prison violence in Chile, I seek to contribute the field 
by providing a comparative perspective of inmate violence, as well as to obtain findings that 
could inform policies to help reduce prison violence. 
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Chapter III 
Methods 
The preceding chapters presented an overview of theoretical models that attempt to 
explain the causes of prison violence, as well as empirical findings on prison violence and its 
correlates.  Prior chapters also presented a discussion of some of the limitations of the current 
literature.  Some of the identified gaps in current research on prison violence have to do with the 
lack of research in developing countries, the infrequent consideration of the three models 
(deprivation, importation, and administrative-control) together, the lack of national-level data 
analysis, and the tendency of many studies to use only administrative data.  Discussion in the 
previous chapters demonstrated that prison violence in Chile has rarely been studied and that 
doing so would contribute to filling a gap in the literature, as well as to promoting a discussion 
about prison reform in Chile.  This chapter describes the study’s research questions, main 
hypotheses, variables and measures, data sources, and the analytic strategy I plan to use. 
3.1. Research Questions 
Deprivation-oriented variables have been found to be relevant for understanding prison 
violence.  Prior studies have supported the argument that overcrowding, security level and the 
intensity of the “pains of imprisonment” are positively associated with prison violence 
(Rocheleau, 2013; Gaes, 1994; Farrington & Nuttall, 1980; Sykes, 1958).  At the same time, 
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other variables such as sentence length have a negative relationship with violence (Cunningham 
& Sorensen, 2007; Sorensen & Cunningham, 2010).   
In addition, empirical findings on prison violence have linked violence to the role that 
prison officers and administrators can play in shaping prison violence.  For example, there is 
evidence that lower levels of violence are associated with an effective and supportive prison 
management system (McCorkle et al., 1995; Reisig, 1998; Reisig, 2002; Craig, 2004).  In 
addition, there is evidence that failures in prison management can lead to severe forms of inmate 
violence, including inmate-inmate aggression, inmate homicides, or collective riots (Snacken, 
2005; Sparks et al., 1996; Useem & Kimball, 1989).  Furthermore, research suggests that the 
managerial style of prison administrators and officers can predict job satisfaction and role strain 
among correctional staff (Reisig & Lovrich 1998; Stohr et al.  1994).   
At the same time, different empirical studies that support the importation hypothesis have 
shown that some individual characteristics of inmates are associated with prison violence.  For 
example, inmates’ age is one variable that has consistently negative associations with violent 
events (Kuanliang & Sorensen, 2008; De Lisi et al., 2010; Sorensen & Cunningham, 2010).  In 
addition, previous criminal involvement has positive associations with prison violence (Drury & 
De Lisi, 2010; Arbach-Lucioni, Martinez-García & Andrés-Pueyo, 2012; De Lisi, Berg & 
Hochstetler, 2004). 
Thus, the purpose of this study is threefold.  First, it attempts to determine which 
variables are correlated to violent events in Chilean prisons since, to date, there is no systematic 
information in this regard for the entire prison system beyond anecdotal evidence or prison 
officers’ claimed expertise.  Second, it aims to empirically test three theories of prison violence 
and see which variables among remain significantly associated with violent events when the rest 
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of the variable repertoire is included into the analyses.  Lastly, this study seeks to determine the 
influence of total inmate population on the three models here presented, as well as to find out 
which model has more empirical support from the data here employed.  Specifically, the three 
main research questions to be addressed in the study are as follows: 
1. What are the main correlates of violent events in Chilean prisons? 
2. Which model of prison violence here considered (deprivation, importation or 
administrative-control) is more supported by empirical findings when competing 
models of prison violence are analyzed together?  
3.2. Research Hypotheses  
The exploration of the correlates of prison violence in Chilean facilities is based on the 
following four hypotheses.  Each of these hypotheses, listed below, will be tested to answer the 
study’s research questions: 
Hypothesis I: according to the deprivation theory, poor prison conditions are positively 
related to prison violence.  Scholars have recognized that the prison system should create a 
supportive environment that facilitates inmates’ safety and reintegration (Liebling, 2004), an 
environment where there can be a sense of legitimacy (Sparks & Bottoms, 1995) in sustaining 
the system.  This kind of environment, in turn, creates a safer prison for guards and for officers 
(Coyle, 2003).  On the other hand, harsh, oppressive conditions with excessive use of force or 
even brutality undermine the prison system’s legitimacy and threaten order, security, and 
possibilities for rehabilitation (Sykes, 1958).  Consequently, three sub-hypotheses are derived 
from the literature: 
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H1a: Overcrowding level will be positively related to prison violence.  Despite the fact 
that there are different definitions of overcrowding in the literature (Wooldredge & Steiner, 
2009) and that some scholars have found no association between crowding and violence (Steiner, 
2009), some research evidence has suggested that overcrowding is positively associated with 
prison violence (Martin, Lichtenstein, Jenkot & Forde, 2012; Huey & Mcnulty, 2005; Farrington 
& Nuttall, 1980).  Taking into consideration the under-development and poor prison conditions 
in Latin America, it becomes meaningful to hypothesize that overcrowding might have a positive 
relationship to violence in Chile (INDH, 2012; Dammert & Zúñiga, 2008; Espinoza & Martinez, 
2007). 
H1b: Inmates’ self-reported perception of mistreatment by guards would be positively 
associated with prison violence.  According to the deprivation model, conflicts between guards 
and inmates would be one of the manifestations of the pains of imprisonment and reflect the 
oppositional subculture that takes place in prison settings (Clemmer, 1940; Sykes, 1958; Sykes 
& Messinger, 1960).  Thus, a proxy measure of deprivation conditions would be the reported 
level of conflict between inmates and guards.  More recent research has employed inmates’ self-
reporting on the mistreatment they receive from guards as a proxy variable of deprivation 
(Rocheleau, 2013; Paterline & Petersen, 1999). 
Hypothesis II: according to the administrative-control theory of prison violence, an 
effective and supportive prison management is associated with lower levels of violence.  The 
literature has competing explanations for the role of management in prison violence.  While 
some have argued that maintaining tight control is critical to ensuring a prison’s high level of 
function (Di Iulio, 1987), others have argued that an excessive focus on control without positive 
incentives (work programs, remunerative forms of control) can even be counterproductive in 
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terms of security and order (Huebner, 2003; Reisig, 2002; McCorkle et al., 1995).  Derived from 
the literature, then, there are two sub-hypotheses: 
H2a: Inmates’ participation in prison programs would be associated with decreased 
aggregate levels of violence within the facility.  As noticed by the research literature, there is an 
association between higher proportions of prisoners participating in prison programming and a 
reduction in the rates of violence (McCorkle et al., 1995; Walrath, 2001; Huebner, 2003). 
H2b: It is hypothesized that the proportion of inmates who have been subjected to solitary 
confinement is positively associated with prison violence only when the use of disciplinary 
housing is too low or too high, taking the form of a U-shape.  On the one hand, research findings 
have shown that the use of coercive controls are not associated with prison violence and that, 
moreover, strict rule enforcement and emphasis on control and security may increase prison 
violence (Huebner, 2003; Reisig, 1998).  On the other hand, the use of disciplinary housing has 
been found to be related with lower levels of violence both cross-sectionally and longitudinally 
(Steiner, 2009). 
Hypothesis III: According to the importation theory of prison violence, inmates’ 
individual characteristics, the repertoire of previous experiences and other background traits 
inmates bring from the outside to prison, are very influential in the occurrence of violent events 
(Cunningham, 2007; Arbach-Lucioni, Martinez-Garcia & Andres-Pueyo, 2012).  Among the 
variety of individual characteristics that are associated with violence, this study takes into 
account two of them, namely age and criminal engagement. 
H3a: According to the literature, inmates’ age is negatively associated with violent events 
in prisons. While this dissertation has no data at the individual level, inmates’ average ages by 
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facility have been obtained from the Gendarmería.  Thus, the expectation is that prisons with 
lower average ages would have more violent events.   
H3b: Inmates’ average level of criminal engagement would be positively associated with 
the occurrence of violent events.  Thus it is expected that in facilities where there are higher 
proportions of inmates classified as “highly-engaged”, more violent events may occur. 
3.3. Data Source and Study Sample 
Data for this dissertation were obtained from two sources: i) administrative data on prison 
violence and ii) indicators on the perception of prison life from a national-level inmate survey.  
Below is a detailed description of the two datasets. 
--Administrative Dataset on Violent Events by Prison Facility in 2012 [ADM] 
This dataset, ADM, is an Excel file generated by the Statistical Unit of the Gendarmería 
in Santiago that contains information on the number of recorded violent events (according to the 
criteria mentioned above) by each facility in the nation during 2012.  It includes official 
information on violent events at the facility level for 83 facilities that was gathered from 
computational records that are updated and maintained in the central office of the Gendarmería 
in Santiago.  The dataset contains no individual-level information at all and only facility-level 
data were available. This excel file also contains information on additional variables of interest, 
such as overcrowding level by month in 2012, total inmate population by month in 2012, type of 
prison (public or private), and the level of security of each prison in 2012.   
 
 
44 
 
--First Survey on Inmates’ Perception of Quality of Prison Life – 2013 [SURVEY]  
SURVEY was a nationally representative, face-to-face survey of Chilean adults aged 18 
or older living in prison facilities in Chile during the 2013 calendar year. It was the first 
comprehensive assessment on inmates’ perception about their conditions of imprisonment in 
Chile. This evaluation work was sponsored by the Chilean Bureau of Prisons (Gendarmería de 
Chile) and led by the same author of this dissertation while he worked for the Unit for Protection 
and Promotion of Human Rights within Gendarmería in 2013. The research team conducted the 
survey in 75 facilities nationwide (out of 82) and the principal investigator (Sanhueza himself) 
trained research team members (individuals with very scant or no social research training) in 
basic survey techniques, research ethics and basic research skills.  
As a result, 2,093 individuals were surveyed to answer 42 questions regarding different 
topics of prison life: i) perception of prison conditions, infrastructure and amenities (food, 
bathrooms, ventilation, etc.); ii) perception of physical, psychological and sexual mistreatment 
by guards or other inmates; iii) participation in prison programming; iv) having been in solitary 
confinement or administrative segregation (in the current prison); and v) priorities for change in 
this facility, among others.  The entire questionnaire took about 25 minutes (on average) to be 
completed by respondent inmates (who were usually gathered in small chapels, administrative 
offices, prisons’ sport facilities or in other physical spaces to respond) with an overall response 
rate of 78% for the entire country.   
This dataset contained only facility-level data and no individual-level information was 
available based on ethical reasons. Indeed, despite that SURVEY initially employed a 
randomized, stratified sampling strategy that identified individuals and gathered information 
from them, once questionnaires were completed and entered into a database, identifiers were 
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removed and deleted from the dataset in order to i) secure confidentiality and anonymity of the 
information provided by inmates and ii) to avoid possible adverse effects, reprisals or retaliation 
effects towards inmates by prison guards or administrators. This decision was taken by the 
principal investigator of SURVEY and found the support and understanding from his superior of 
the time at Gendarmeria.  
In next page, Table 2 summarizes the total responses and provides details regarding the 
response rates by facility from SURVEY.   
Table 2: SURVEY’s Total Responses and Response Rates by Facility 
(Facilities have been ordered geographically, from north to south) 
Region of the country / facility name expected 
sample 
actual 
sample 
Response Rate (%) 
XV 
C.P.  DE ARICA 90 67           0.74  
I  
C.C.P.  DE IQUIQUE 62 46           0.74  
C.D.P.  DE POZO ALMONTE 17 17           1.00  
C.P.  ALTO HOSPICIO 45 43           0.96  
II 
C.C.P.  DE ANTOFAGASTA 36 34           0.94  
C.D.P.  DE CALAMA 42 42           1.00  
C.D.P.  DE TALTAL 25 24           0.96  
C.D.P.  DE TOCOPILLA 33 16           0.48  
C.P.F.  DE ANTOFAGASTA 35 31           0.89  
III  
C.C.P.  DE CHAÑARAL 35 35           1.00  
C.C.P.  DE COPIAPO 42 36           0.86  
C.D.P.  DE VALLENAR 37 34           0.92  
IV  
C.D.P.  DE COMBARBALA 9 7           0.78  
C.D.P.  DE ILLAPEL 32 19           0.59  
C.D.P.  DE OVALLE 36 34           0.94  
C.D.P.  DE VICUÑA 11 10           0.91  
C.P.  LA SERENA 67 39           0.58  
V 
C.C.P.  DE LOS ANDES 37 34           0.92  
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C.C.P.  DE SAN ANTONIO 36 19           0.53  
C.C.P.  DE SAN FELIPE 21 19           0.90  
C.D.P.  DE CASABLANCA 19 13           0.68  
C.D.P.  DE LA LIGUA 21 19           0.90  
C.D.P.  DE LIMACHE - -  - 
C.D.P.  DE PETORCA 9 7           0.78  
C.D.P.  DE QUILLOTA - - - 
C.P.  DE VALPARAISO 104 70           0.67  
RM (Santiago Area) 
C.C.P.  DE COLINA I 22 22           1.00  
C.C.P.  DE COLINA II 41 34           0.83  
C.C.P.  DE CORDILLERA - -  - 
C.C.P.  DE PUNTA PEUCO - - - 
C.D.P.  DE PUENTE ALTO 37 23           0.62  
C.D.P.  DE SANTIAGO SUR 168 168           1.00  
C.D.P.  DE TALAGANTE 21 18           0.86  
C.D.P.  SANTIAGO I  - -  - 
C.P.F.  DE SAN MIGUEL 83 51           0.61  
C.P.F.  DE SANTIAGO 261 134           0.51  
UNIDAD ESPECIAL ALTA SEGURIDAD  -  - - 
VI  
C.C.P.  DE RENGO 15 10           0.67  
C.C.P.  DE SANTA CRUZ 32 27           0.84  
C.D.P.  DE PEUMO 21 17           0.81  
C.P.  RANCAGUA 95 49           0.52  
VII  
C.C.P.  DE CAUQUENES 37 26           0.70  
C.C.P.  DE CURICO 23 14           0.61  
C.C.P.  DE LINARES 21 19           0.90  
C.C.P.  DE TALCA 25 14           0.56  
C.D.P.  DE CHANCO 22 22           1.00 
C.P.F.  DE TALCA 24 17           0.71  
VIII  
C.C.P.  DE BULNES 17 15           0.88  
C.C.P.  DE CHILLAN 38 35           0.92  
C.C.P.  DE CORONEL 21 18           0.86  
C.C.P.  DEL BIO BIO 23 15           0.65  
C.D.P.  DE ARAUCO 18 10           0.56  
C.D.P.  DE LEBU 20 11           0.55  
C.D.P.  DE LOS ANGELES 22 14           0.64  
C.D.P.  DE MULCHEN 21 17           0.81  
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C.D.P.  DE QUIRIHUE 16 16           1.00  
C.D.P.  DE SAN CARLOS 21 21           1.00  
C.D.P.  DE YUMBEL 21 21           1.00  
C.D.P.  DE YUNGAY 21 14           0.67  
C.P.  DE CONCEPCION 91 88           0.97  
IX  
C.C.P.  DE LAUTARO 17 13           0.76  
C.C.P.  DE NUEVA IMPERIAL 21 14           0.67  
C.C.P.  DE TEMUCO 23 12           0.52  
C.C.P.  DE VICTORIA 30 28           0.93  
C.D.P.  DE ANGOL 30 20           0.67  
C.D.P.  DE CURACAUTIN 17 17           1.00  
C.D.P.  DE PITRUFQUEN 15 7           0.47  
C.D.P.  DE TRAIGUEN 20 20           1.00  
C.D.P.  DE VILLARRICA 33 19           0.58  
C.P.F.  DE TEMUCO 19 17           0.89  
XIV 
C.C.P.  DE RIO BUENO 21 19           0.90  
C.P.  DE VALDIVIA 46 39           0.85  
X  
C.C.P.  DE OSORNO 40 39           0.98  
C.D.P.  DE ANCUD 22 15           0.68  
C.D.P.  DE CASTRO 21 21           1.00  
C.P.  DE PUERTO MONTT 44 43           0.98  
XI  
C.C.P.  DE COYHAIQUE 19 19           1.00  
C.D.P.  DE CHILE CHICO - -  - 
C.D.P.  DE COCHRANE - - - 
C.D.P.  DE PUERTO AYSEN 17 15           0.88  
XII 
C.D.P.  DE PORVENIR 8 7           0.88  
C.D.P.  DE PUERTO NATALES 14 14           1.00  
C.P.  DE PUNTA ARENAS 23 20           0.87  
     
TOTAL 2,699 2,093         0.775  
 75 surveyed prisons 
 8 not-surveyed prisons 
 83  total prisons 
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Identifiers were deleted from the dataset after survey application, so no information at the 
individual level (except for gender) is, or will be, available to anyone using the dataset.  
Although the SURVEY was conducted in 2013, one year after the administrative data on violent 
events for the 2012 calendar year, the assumption is that the structural characteristics of prisons 
and their populations would have change little between 2012 and 2013.  In the next paragraphs, I 
describe in detail each of the measures and data sources available for each variable. 
3.4. Description of the Study Variables 
According to many scholars in the field of prisons, prison order is a concept that 
encompasses legitimacy, mutual respect, and decency, i.e. not merely the absence of violence 
(Sparks & Bottoms, 1995; Liebling, 2004; Ward, Gannon & Birgden, 2007).  Nevertheless, the 
absence of violence is a necessary condition for an orderly facility, which in turn is a prerequisite 
for treatment and rehabilitation (Di Iulio, 1987; Coyle, 2003). This is not to say, though, that the 
problem of prison violence should be only reduced to a single, aggregate-level indicator. Rather, 
the use of this a single measure—number of violent events, for example—is thought to be 
helpful for facilitating an initial account of prison violence in Chilean facilities, especially in 
light of the scant previous findings in the field in developing nations (Gendreau, Goggin, & Law, 
1997).   
Prior research has identified a variety of variables as correlates of prison violence.  As 
discussed in the literature review section, three main theories have proposed explanations for 
prison violence: the importation, deprivation, and administrative-control models.  The 
importation model assigns the causes of violence to the characteristics that inmates bring into the 
prison from their own backgrounds and argues that violence merely mirrors what inmates have 
experienced on the outside.  The deprivation model, on the other hand, posits that harsh and 
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oppressive prison conditions inflict “pains of imprisonment” on inmates, generating a subculture 
of resistance and opposition that, in turn, generates violence.  Finally, the administrative-control 
(also called prison management) model argues that prison officers and administrators are key 
actors in influencing prison outcomes and inmate behavior; thus, violence would be the result of 
inadequate prison management.  These three models were tested in this study, and a description 
of the variables included in the analyses is presented below.  The description begins with the 
dependent variable and is followed by the description of the independent and control variables. 
3.4.1 Dependent Variable – Violent Events at the Facility Level 
Given the broad and multifaceted nature of prison violence (McGuirre, 2008) and that it 
seems that there is no agreed-upon benchmark for how in-prison violence should be 
conceptualized (Jackson & Brownstein, 2004), it is necessary to provide a definition for “prison 
violence” (including its operational definition) in order to ensure precise use of the term in the 
present study.  This is important because even in developed countries, the research on prison 
violence has shown that it occurs in different forms and has multiple dimensions (Wolff et al., 
2008), not to mention that the methodologies employed to measure prison violence also vary 
considerably (Wolff, Shi & Bachman, 2008).  Furthermore, I have chosen to examine violent 
events at the facility level, and the rationale for this choice is rooted in the literature on prison 
violence.  Indeed, data on a facility’s level of misconduct can reflect degrees of order within a 
correctional institution (Steiner, 2009).  Moreover, the inclusion of aggregate, facility-level 
predictors of violence constitute elements in the overall environment of a prison, and changes 
occurring in its social structure may impact a prison’s levels of violence (Bottoms, 1999; Camp, 
Gaes, Langan & Saylor, 2003). 
50 
 
Thus, in this study “prison violence” will be understood as the total number of violent 
events at the aggregate prison level during 2012.  Its main operational criteria are: 
• The occurrence involves physical violence.  
• The occurrence is interpersonal and involves intentional violence (Jackson & Brownstein, 
2004). 
• “Prison violence” here refers to a violent event registered as such in official records, i.e. 
as a serious violent offence, including those only resulting in serious injury (requiring 
medical treatment, e.g. cut, bleeding, unconscious, etc.).  (Thornberry et al, 1995). 
• According to the Penitentiary Code (number 78, letter K), a violent event may be deadly 
or non-deadly but it involves the use of a weapon or an object used as such (usually a 
handmade one), for the purpose of damaging the other person. 
• “Prison violence” as used here only refers to inmate-on-inmate violence (not inmate-staff 
violence). 
In contrast, “those acts in which someone was hurt or injured, but perhaps only in a minor 
way (…) hitting, getting into fights and so on” (Thornberry et al, 1995, p.224) will not be 
included in the present study.  In addition, the present study also excludes attempted-but-not-
committed physical violent acts, any sort of sexual assault, and any form of exercising 
psychological violence.   
Before proceeding to the next section, it is important to notice several limitations in the 
prison violence measurement employed here.  First, the administrative data does not contain 
information regarding inmate-staff assaults, which is another important indicator of prison 
violence in the literature.  Second, although the measurement covers violent events at the prison 
level, it does not include other forms of more common violence such as minor fights, 
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psychological victimization, or even sexual abuse, despite preliminary evidence that suggests 
that violence is a common experience in Chilean prisons (INDH, 2013; Sanhueza, in press).  
Third, due to limited information in both SURVEY and the administrative records provided by 
Gendarmeria, it was not possible to link violent events to with the individual characteristics of 
inmates. Only a couple of aggregate proxies were available for this research, namely average age 
per facility and average levels of “criminal engagement” by facility, according to the 
Gendarmería’s assessment. 
3.4.2. Independent Variables 
Measurements for the deprivation and administrative control model of prison violence are 
no easy task, as these theories have been operationalized using different criteria from the 
literature.  To facilitate the presentation of and the rationale for the choice of variables, 
independent variables have been divided into two sub-sections based on whether they are 
ascribed to either the deprivation or the administrative control/management model of prison 
violence. 
3.4.2.1 Independent Variables for the Deprivation Theory  
• Occupancy Rate: a number that indicates prison design capacity vs. real occupancy, 
based on administrative information at the facility level provided by Gendarmería 
records.  For example, a rate of 100 would indicate total occupancy of the facility 
with no overcrowding.  An occupancy rate of 200 would mean that, in a space 
designed to house 100 inmates, there were actually 200 individuals living there.  
Different scholars have found a relationship between overcrowding as a measure of 
deprivation and prison violence (Gaes & McGuire, 1985; Lester, 1990).  In addition, 
in Latin American prisons, the reality of overcrowding surpasses the standards 
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overcrowding in developed nations.  In many cases, the environment of overcrowding 
is degrading in terms of providing decent conditions (INDH, 2012; Gendarmería, 
unpublished report).   
• Mistreatment by guards: average percentage of inmates reporting physical and 
psychological mistreatment by guards, based on aggregated, facility-level data of the 
2013 Survey on Inmates’ Perception of Prison Life.  In order to facilitate both model 
calculations and interpretations, the percentage reporting mistreatment by guards was 
multiplied by 100 to create a new variable called <mistreatguar100>.  According to 
Sykes (1958) and other deprivation scholars (Rocheleau, 2013; Gaes, 1994; Cooley, 
1993), the oppressive conditions to which inmates are subjected would generate an 
oppositional subculture between guards and inmates which, in turn, would generate 
conflict and violence.   
3.4.2.2 Independent Variables for the Administrative-Control Model 
• Program participation: composite score for inmates’ access to six different types of 
in-prison programs (work-for-pay, job skills training, prison school, psycho-social 
interventions, sport activities, arts) in each facility, based on aggregated, facility-level 
data from the 2013 Survey on Inmates’ Perception of Prison Life.  Thus, a score of 
0.5 would indicate that, on average, each inmate has participated in a half-program or, 
better said, that, on average, half of inmates have had access to only one program 
(this could be any program).  A program score of 2.0 would mean that, on average, 
each inmate in that prison has participated in two programs.  The inclusion of this 
indicator within the administrative-control model is consonant with research findings 
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from a variety of studies (i.e.  Fleisher, 1989; Kimmet & Martin, 2002; Huebner, 
2003; Walrath, 2001) 
• Inmates who report having been in solitary confinement in the facility: percentage of 
inmates who responded that they have been in solitary confinement in the facility 
while staying there, based on aggregated, facility-level data from the 2013 Survey on 
Inmates’ Perception of Prison Life.  In order to facilitate both model calculations and 
interpretations, the proportion of inmates reporting mistreatment by guards was 
multiplied by 100 to create a new variable called <propsolitary100>.  This variable 
corresponds to part of the administrative-control model in the sense that coercive 
controls have also been found to be relevant to the decrease of violence (Steiner, 
2009).  
3.4.2.3 Independent Variables for the Importation model 
• Inmates’ average age at the facility level: provided by the Gendarmería’s Statistical 
Unit, these data show the average age of the inmate population at the end of the 2012 
calendar year.  Age consistently has been found to be negatively associated with 
inmate misconduct, with younger inmates showing more frequent or more violent 
behavior than older inmates (Drury & De Lisi, 2010; Sorensen & Cunningham, 2010; 
Kuanliang & Sorensen, 2008).  Thus, it is expected that more violent events would 
occur where the average age of inmates is lower.   
• Proportion of inmates classified as “highly engaged in criminal activities”: once 
sentenced, each inmate is assessed and classified according to a protocol established 
by the Gendarmería in order to properly identify the extent to which the individual 
could have been involved in criminal activities.  Despite the fact that this assessment 
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is currently under review by the Gendarmería itself, it is still a valid proxy for an 
inmate’s criminal history and, as such, a proxy for inmate misconduct.  In order to 
facilitate both model calculations and interpretations, the proportion of “highly 
engaged” inmates was multiplied by 100 to create a new variable called <phigh100>.  
Thus, it is expected that prisons with higher concentrations of “highly engaged” 
individuals would exhibit higher levels of violence. 
3.4.3 Control Variable 
Both prior research and the penitentiary’s professional wisdom suggest that although 
many of the observed differences in prison violence may respond to deprivation-related factors, 
to management-related variables, or to individuals’ characteristics, violent events in prison may 
also have to do with underlying variables, such as the total population size (Wooldredge & 
Steiner, 2009; Drury & DeLisi, 2010; McCorkle, Miethe & Drass, 1995), which should be 
controlled in the statistical analysis.  Thus, aside from the main independent variables from 
deprivation, administrative-control or importation models, the total population size has been 
included as a control variable because it is expected that, as the number of inmates increases, the 
likelihood of violence may increase as well. 
• Total inmate population: An average count of the total inmate population based on 
administrative information at the facility level provided by the Gendarmería at the 
end of the 2012 calendar year.  Despite the fact that some scholars have argued that 
this variable should be included within a deprivation approach (McCorkle, Miethe & 
Drass, 1995), total population size may also have an effect on violence simply 
because there are more individuals to allow for conflict to happen.  Thus, this study 
follows previous studies where total population size has been included as a control 
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covariate (Wooldredge & Steiner, 2009; Farrington & Nuttall, 1980). Figure 1 
summarizes the variables: 
Figure 1: Summary of variables employed in this study 
Dependent variable 
Violent events 
Independent Variables 
(Deprivation Theory) 
Occupancy Rate  
Mistreatment by Guards  
(Administrative-Control Theory)  
Inmates’ Participation in Prison Programming  
Proportion of Inmates in solitary confinement  
(Importation Theory) 
Inmates’ average age per facility 
Proportion of inmates “highly-engaged” in criminal activities  
Control Variable 
Total Inmate population 
 
3.5. Analytic Strategy 
This study includes two types of analyses.  First, descriptive information is presented on 
the dependent, independent, and control variables and on the associations between them.  Then, 
seven multivariate count models (negative binomial regression models) were run to analyze the 
associations between violence and the three theories of prison violence here employed.   
Additional predicted counts for violent events were run and graphically displayed in the full 
model. 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations  
First, descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations, and percentages are 
generated to summarize the aggregated characteristics of the dependent variable (violent events), 
the characteristics of the facilities in the sample (since the units of analysis will be prisons, not 
individuals), and the main characteristics of the independent and control variables.   
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Second, a correlation matrix and cross tabulations were employed to identify associations 
between violent events and the different independent variables and to identify potential problems 
with multi-collinearity.  In any case where a pair of independent variables might surpass the rule 
of thumb of r >0.7, an additional test for multi-collinearity was conducted, namely the variance 
inflation factor [VIF]. 
Multivariate analyses 
Data for the dependent variable “violent events by facility” show that, among the 83 
operating facilities throughout the country, there are reports on violence for 52 of them, with 31 
registering no serious violent incidents in 2012.  The facilities are over dispersed, positively 
skewed, and many facilities report zero incidents during the observation period.  In what follows, 
data will be analyzed using negative binomial regression7, following the approach employed in 
similar cases in other prison violence studies (e.g. Drury & DeLisi, 2009; Keith, 2006; Sorensen 
& Cunningham, 2008).  All data analyses were conducted with STATA 13.0 (StataCorp, 2013). 
In order to facilitate parsimonious analyses, four different models were run to test the 
three theories of prison violence aforementioned, as well as to analyze and contrast the different 
theories all together.  Thus, Model 1 tested the deprivation hypothesis of prison violence; Model 
2 tested the administrative-control theory; Model 3 tested the importation hypothesis; and Model 
4, the Full Model, included the deprivation, the administrative-control and the importation 
variables. 
7 I run different statistical procedures to test whether negative binomial regression model was the most appropriate 
approach to analyze the data, in comparison to alternative approaches such as the zero-inflated or the Poisson 
negative binomial. I selected negative binomial over the zero-inflated model because the observed variance was 
much larger than the mean, in whose case negative binomial is preferred. In addition, to compare the negative 
binomial model against the Poisson model I interpreted the information provided by the value of “alpha” that is 
shown while using the multivariate negative binomial regression command; the chi-square value associated with the 
alpha was different from zero, which meant that the use of the negative binomial was more appropriate for analyzing 
the data than the Poisson model.  
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Thus, Model 1 analyzed the deprivation model and included two variables that had been 
selected as representative of such an approach, namely occupancy rate and mistreatment by 
guards, including the total inmate population as a control variable in the equation.  Following the 
same strategy, Model 2 tested the administrative-control model and two characteristic variables: 
program participation and the proportion of inmates in solitary confinement, adjusting for total 
inmate population.  Model 3 tested the importation hypothesis of prison violence and included 
two typical variables: inmates’ average age at the facility level and a proxy variable for “criminal 
history,” the proportion of inmates classified by the Gendarmería as “highly engaged” in 
criminal activities.  Again, the total inmate population was included as a control variable.  
Finally, Model 4, the Full Model, includes the six variables representing the theories of prison 
violence, along with total population size as a control variable.  Figure 2 (below) summarizes the 
four models to be tested. 
Figure 2: models analyzed and variables included in each model 
 
Variable Model  
1 
Deprivation model 
Model  
2 
Administrative-
Control model 
Model  
3 
Importation 
model 
Model  
4 
Full Model 
1+2+3 all together 
Occupancy Rate *   * 
% mistreatment by guards *   * 
Program participation  *  * 
% Solitary confinement  *  * 
Inmates’ average age    * * 
% inmates highly-engaged    * * 
Total inmate population * * * * 
 
Thus, the four models to be tested would look as follows:   
Model 1: testing the Deprivation Model 
1. Number of violent events = occupancy rate + % mistreatment by guards*100 + total 
inmate population  
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Model 2: testing the Administrative-Control Model 
2. Number of violent events = inmates’ participation in prison programs + proportion of 
inmates in solitary confinement*100 + total inmate population  
Model 3: testing the Importation Model 
3. Number of violent events = inmates’ average age + proportion of inmates classified 
as highly-engaged in criminal activities*100 + total inmate population  
Model 4: Full Model  
4. Number of violent events = occupancy rate + % mistreatment by guards*100 + 
inmates’ participation in prison programs + proportion of inmates in solitary 
confinement*100 + average inmates’ age + proportion of inmates highly engaged in 
criminal activities*100 + total inmate population  
Incidence Rate Ratios and Analyses for Predicted Counts 
This study employed negative binomial regression models to model the counts of violent 
events in Chilean prisons.  Although the use of this statistical technique is appropriate for 
analyzing this type of data (counts), from the point of view of the interpretation of the results, the 
value of the coefficients is difficult to understand by someone who is not very familiar with 
statistics; thus, the coefficients represent the difference in the logs of expected counts (to 
decrease or increase) by the amount indicated in the coefficient. Thus, since negative binomial 
regression coefficients are difficult to interpret, the results of each model were presented using 
“Incidence Rate Ratio” (IRR), which refers to the estimated rate of change (increase or decrease) 
in the number of violent events, for a one-unit increase in the predictor variable, given the other 
variables being held constant in the model.   
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After analyzing data using univariate, bivariate, and multivariate statistics, additional 
tables and figures will be used to illustrate predicted counts for violent events and, in particular, 
to illustrate the results of the negative binomial regression in the Full Model (Model 4).  
Predicted counts (or predicted probabilities) is a statistical procedure that helps to interpret the 
effect of a certain independent variable of interest on the dependent variable, while holding the 
rest of the independent variables constant at their means or at any other fixed value (Powers & 
Xie, 2008).  The command <margins> that is available in Stata 13.0 will be employed to conduct 
this type of analysis.  In addition, in order to facilitate an interpretation of the results, illustrations 
of the predicted probabilities will be employed using the command <marginsplot> that is 
available in Stata 13.0 (Statacorp, 2013).  This graphical aid will be employed for each of the 
independent variables in the full model to help in the interpretation of the results.   
3.6. Data Strengths and Limitations 
Before moving forward, there are some limitations that need to be made explicit about 
this study in advance. First, data for this dissertation mostly consisted of aggregated, facility-
level variables with no individual-level information available. This is a limitation because 
inmates’ characteristics are important to understanding prison violence (Drury & De Lisi, 2010; 
Kuanliang & Sorensen, 2008). The main reason for such lack of individual data had to do with 
ethical reasons: the possibility of identifying inmates’ individual responses and the risk of 
reprisals or future retaliation against them (let us recall that that was the main reason why data 
from SURVEY were anonymized –identifiers removed and deleted—after data collection took 
place in 2013). Thus, no individual-level information was available from that dataset. 
Nevertheless, two aggregate-level variables that represent individuals’ characteristics with regard 
to age and criminal engagement were obtained from the Gendarmería, which supplied, at least 
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partially, the requirement for information about individuals. A second limitation had to do with 
the use of secondary, administrative data, which implies the possibility of some inconsistency 
while recording violent events across different prisons. Although the use of administrative 
records are not usually thought for research purposes, various double-check mechanisms were 
applied to make sure that administrative records (particularly those involving the dependent 
variable violent events) could be taken as valid and reliable indicators of prison violence. Some 
of these mechanisms included interviews with prison officers and guards, a review of the Chilean 
penitentiary law, and different working meetings with the Statistical Department of 
Gendarmería. Finally, a last limitation that needs to be taken into consideration is the fact that 
findings from this study were cross-sectional in nature, making it impossible to establish 
causality for the models included here. Nonetheless, this study was the first systematic 
assessment of the entire prison system and prison life in Chile ever done and, thus, it is expected 
that future research can contribute to monitor longitudinal changes. 
Nevertheless, the overall strengths of the data and the types of analyses used 
counterbalance the limitations.  One particular strength is that the data for this dissertation come 
from a combination of administrative records and survey data.   Another strength, compared with 
many prior studies, is the use of multiple indicators representative of three of the theories on 
prison violence; the use of multiple indicators is an advantage because there are few studies that 
jointly analyze three approaches.  The use of multiple indicators will deepen our understanding 
of how different approaches could be associated with prison violence.  Finally, the data allow for 
national analyses since 75 facilities (out of 83) from throughout the entire country were included 
in the analyses.  In sum, this study should enhance our understanding of the correlates of prison 
violence in Chile, making this study a significant contribution to the field. 
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Chapter IV 
Findings and Analyses  
The analyses in this study include two parts.  In this first part, descriptive statistics—
including means, standard deviations, percentages, and a correlation matrix—are generated to 
summarize the main characteristics of the dependent variable (violent events), the distribution of 
both the independent and control variables in the sample of facilities (since the units of analysis 
are prisons, not individuals), and the associations between the variables.  The second part is a 
presentation of five multivariate models that employ negative binomial regression to explore the 
association between the deprivation and the administrative-control models with the dependent 
variable, once we have controlled for other confounding variables. 
4.1 Descriptive Findings 
Table 3 (next page) shows the distribution for both the dependent and independent 
variables, as well as for the control variable, considering data for the entire sample. Most missing 
data had to do with the fact that the SURVEY conducted in 2013 on the perception of quality of 
prison life was not carried out in all facilities nationwide.  Indeed, out of the 83 prisons that were 
operating at that time, the SURVEY was conducted in only 75 of them (Table 2 in the Methods 
Chapter, pages 46-48, showed the total responses and response rates by facility).  Thus, data on 
mistreatment by guards, participation in prison programming, and the proportion of inmates in 
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solitary confinement were missing for 8 prisons.8  Any other facilities with incomplete data were 
already among those with incomplete data on the aforementioned variables.    
TABLE 3: Descriptive characteristics of dependent and independent variables 
(entire sample n=83) 
Variable Observations Mean Std.  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
violent events 
83 7.67 16.15 0 91 
Occupancy rate 
(%) 
79 128.19 59.3 32.5 346.4 
Mistreatment by 
guards (%) 
75 .367 .203 0 .812 
Program 
participation  
75 1.63 .49 .67 2.67 
% Solitary 
confinement  
75 .327 .192 0 .75 
Inmates’ 
average age 
81 34.17 2.48 29.8 45.3 
Proportion 
highly engaged 
81 .148 .134 0 .68 
Inmate total 
population 
81 586.7 884.9 13 5,095 
 
Thus, after excluding missing data, the analytic sample comprised 75 prison facilities. 
Table 4 (in the next page) shows the distribution of the variables in the analytic sample. Among 
the 75 prison facilities that were considered in this study, the average number of violent events 
was 7.9 violent events per prison during 2012, with a broad range of variation between 0 and 91.  
Moreover, whereas there were 27 facilities with no violent events during 2012, most of the 
violent incidents that took place during that year were concentrated in some metropolitan prisons 
in large cities, such as Santiago, Valparaíso, Concepción, Antofagasta, and Talca.  Appendix 1 
8 The eight facilities that could not be visited in 2013 were: 1) “CDP Santiago I,” which housed about 3,500 in 
transit, held-for-trial individuals.  The reasons for not visiting had to do with logistical problems and the distinctive 
nature of this private prison; 2) CDP Limache, due to logistical reasons; 3) CDP Quillota, due to a prison fire very 
close to the date planned for assessment in 2013; 4) “CDP Cochrane” and 5) “CDP Chile Chico,” both due to their 
distant and inaccessible geographic location; 6) “CCP Punta Peuco,” due to the fact that it houses former military 
personnel for crimes against human rights during Pinochet’s regime and because it is already known for having 
better conditions; 7) “CCP Cordillera,” closed by an executive decision from the presidency; and 8) “Carcel de Alta 
Seguridad,” because of the distinctive, nature of the crimes (terrorism) its inmates committed. 
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presents the complete list of prison facilities ordered according to the number of recorded violent 
events in 2012.   
TABLE 4: Descriptive characteristics of dependent and independent variables 
(analytic sample n=75) 
Variable Observations Mean Std.  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
violent events 
75 7.9 16.9 0 91 
Occupancy rate 
(%) 
75 125.7 54.7 32.5 346.4 
Mistreatment by 
guards (%) 
75 .367 .203 0 .812 
Program 
participation  
75 1.63 .49 .67 2.67 
% Solitary 
confinement  
75 .327 .192 0 .75 
Inmates’ 
average age 
75 34.2 2.53 29.8 45.3 
Proportion 
highly engaged 
75 .144 .120 0 .68 
Inmate total 
population 
75 569.8 837.4 13 5,095 
 
In terms of the independent variables, the average occupancy rate of the prison system 
was 125.7, meaning that there were, on average, around 126 inmates in a space designed for 
housing only 100 (representing 25.7% overcrowding).  The standard deviation of 54.7 suggests 
that there is considerable variation between establishments, and the range confirms this.  Indeed, 
whereas it was possible to find prisons with occupancy rates as high as 287.2%, other facilities 
were only occupied at a 32.5% of their capacity. 
In terms of the proportion of inmates that reported mistreatment from guards, the 
composite score indicates an average of 36.7% for mistreatment, meaning that, on average, more 
than one-third of inmates in Chile would have suffered from either physical and/or psychological 
mistreatment from guards in that facility.  The standard deviation of 20.3% suggests a great deal 
of variation between establishments, and the range seems to reaffirm this, since no mistreatment 
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was reported by inmates in some prisons, while in others, reports of mistreatment reached 
proportions as high as 81%. 
The involvement of inmates in prison programming was measured as a composite score 
with possible values ranging from 0 to 5, with zero meaning no participation, and 5 meaning 
participation in five programs during the length of stay of respondents in a particular prison.  The 
observed mean of 1.63 suggests that one may expect a typical inmate to participate in 1 or 2 
programs in every facility during his/her stay at that particular prison.  The standard deviation of 
.48 indicates that there is little variation in program participation and seems to confirm the 
problems of unproductive free time and a lack of activities that affect Chilean prisons. 
The percentage of inmates who report having been in solitary confinement in the facility 
suggests that about one third of respondents (32.7%) would have been in solitary confinement in 
that particular prison. The standard deviation (.19) suggests that such an average hides important 
variations by prison with regard to solitary confinement, since up to 75% of respondents in some 
prisons reported solitary confinement. 
The average age in the analytic sample was 34.2 years, with a standard deviation of 2.5 
years.  Nevertheless, there were facilities housing inmates whose average age was 29.8 whereas 
others housed inmates who with the average age of 45.3 years.    
The proportion of inmates assessed by the Gendarmería as “highly engaged” in criminal 
activities had a mean of 14.8%, but also showed important variations between establishments.  
Whereas some facilities housed no highly engaged inmates, in others, highly engaged inmates 
composed almost half of their population (47.1%). 
In terms of the control variable, the total inmate population had an average value of 570 
in the analytic sample, yet important variations in prison size were observed (with a standard 
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deviation of 837 individuals).  Indeed, whereas some prisons were operating with as few as 13 
inmates, many others housed more than 1,000 individuals.9   
In terms of the associations between the independent and dependent variables, a 
correlation matrix is employed to identify potential problems with multi-collinearity. Table 5 
shows the results of the inter-correlation matrix using the Pearson’s r statistic:  
 
Among the dependent and independent variables, the strongest bivariate correlation that 
was observed was between total inmate population and violent events (r =.76), which anticipates 
an influential effect of the population size on the occurrence of violent events.  In addition, a 
moderate correlation could be observed between the proportion of inmates classified as “highly 
engaged” in criminal activities and the occurrence of violent events (r =.554).  Another 
9 The Santiago Penitentiary (CDP Santiago Sur) is a particular case as it holds more than 5,000 individuals and is 
one of the most emblematic, oldest, and largest prison in South America. 
TABLE 5: Correlation Matrix (using Pearson’s r) for the dependent and independent variables 
 
 Violent 
events 
Occupancy 
rate 
Mistrea
tment 
by 
guards 
Program 
participation 
% 
solitary 
confin. 
Inmates’ 
average 
age 
% highly 
engaged 
Total 
Inmate 
pop. 
Rate of 
violent 
events*
1000 
Violent 
events 
1.00         
Occupancy 
rate 
.218 1.00        
Mistreatment 
by guards 
.417* .211 1.00       
Program 
participation 
-.083 -.402* -.311* 1.00      
% solitary 
confinement 
.296* .303* .735* -.298* 1.00     
Inmates’ 
average age 
-.218 -.243* -.518* .238* -.536* 1.00    
% highly 
engaged 
.554* .090 .490* -.201 .449* -.346* 1.00   
Total inmate 
population 
.760* .121 .474* -.127 .334* -.209 .573* 1.00  
Rate violent 
events*1000 
.426* .176 .243* -.045 .309* -.360* .356* .439* 1.00 
 
NOTE: (*) indicates a significant value p<.05 
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significant association was found between the proportion of inmates who reported mistreatment 
by guards and the number of violent events that happened in 2012 (r =.417).  The last significant 
association between an independent and dependent variable was the correlation between the 
proportion of inmates in solitary confinement and violent events, whose r coefficient was .296.   
In terms of the correlations between the independent variables, the highest, most 
significant correlation was between the proportion of inmates who reported having been in 
solitary confinement and the proportion of inmates who reported having suffered mistreatment 
by guards (r = .735).  It has been argued that when the correlations among the independent 
variables exceeds the criterion of r >= 0.7, multi-collinearity may become problematic (Berry & 
Feldman, 1985; Wittink, 1988). 
On the other hand, this high correlation was observed only among one pair of variables, 
not affecting the entire set of independent variables.  Nevertheless, in order to clarify whether 
this high correlation may imply a problem for the model, it was necessary to apply a statistical 
technique called “variance inflation factor” [VIF]. The VIF statistic indicates the points where 
the standard error would be “inflated” considering the current degree of multicollinearity 
between the variables. An acceptable “rule of thumb” for a VIF value that would not create 
excessive problems is 10. The results of VIF are shown in Table 4. 
TABLE 6: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Mistreatment by guards 2.45 0.407640 
% solitary confinement 2.45 0.408362 
Inmates’ average Age  1.57 0.635452 
%highly-engaged criminal act 1.44 0.696404 
Program participation 1.28 0.782896 
Occupancy Rate 1.27 0.788856 
Mean VIF 1.74  
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The results for the VIF statistic indicate that there should not be multi-collinearity 
problems between the independent variables because neither the highest value of VIF nor the 
observed mean value of VIF value exceeded the most conservative acceptable limit of VIF=4. 
In terms of the rest of the independent variables, there was a moderately significant 
correlation between the total inmate population and the proportion of inmates classified by the 
Gendarmería as “highly engaged” in criminal activities (r =.573).  Two other independent 
variables found to be positively correlated were the inmate total population and inmates 
reporting mistreatment by guards (r = .474), and an additional positive correlation was found 
between inmates reporting mistreatment by guards and the proportion of inmates classified as 
highly engaged in criminal activities (r =.490).  On the other hand, significant negative 
associations were found between the average age of inmates and (1) the proportion of inmates in 
solitary confinement (r = -.536) and (2) the proportion of inmates reporting mistreat by guards (r 
= -.518).   
Given that none of these other correlations between independent variables exceeded the 
criterion of r > 0.7, we can assume that multicollinearity would not be problematic for the 
estimation of models of violent events.   
4.2 Multivariate Analyses 
Figure 3 (below) shows the distribution of the dependent variable violent events by 
facility.  Among the 75 facilities in the analytic sample, 48 had reports on violence for 48, with 
27 facilities registering no violent incidents in 2012.  Given that the dependent variable is over-
dispersed and positively skewed, with many facilities reporting zero incidents during the 
observation period, data will be analyzed using negative binomial regression. 
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FIGURE 3: Histogram with the distribution of violent events 
 
  
 The main research questions that guide this dissertation seek to identify correlates of 
prison violence in Chilean prison in 2012.  In order to do so, the dependent variable (violent 
events) was modeled by predictor variables representing three theories of prison violence: the 
deprivation, the administrative-control, and the importation theories.  The central idea was to 
examine how much each model could separately account for variation in violent events in order 
to analyze and contrast the three models at the same time.  Thus, four different models were 
conducted to separately test the three theories of prison violence aforementioned and to analyze 
what happened when the different theories are simultaneously considered. 
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Results for Model 1 are shown in Table 7.  Here, the deprivation model of prison 
violence was tested by including two variables representative of such an approach—occupancy 
rate and mistreatment by guards—and adjusting for inmate population size. 
TABLE 7: Model 1 Deprivation Theory  
 
Negative Binomial Regression 
 
Dispersion         = mean 
Log Likelihood = -177.996 
 Number of Obs =   75 
LR χ2 (3)       =   55.92 
Prob > χ2       =   0.0000 
Pseudo R2     =   0.1358 
Events IRR Std.  Error Z P> z [95% Confidence Interval] 
Occupancy 
Rate  
1.0077 .0029 2.62 0.009 1.0019 1.0135 
Mistreatment 
guards (*100) 
1.021 .0093 2.27 0.023 1.0028 1.0395 
Total inmate 
population 
1.0012 0.00026 4.74 0.000 1.0007 1.0017 
Constant .2775 .1439 -2.47 0.013 1.0037 .7671 
Lnalpha .2263 .2331   -.2305 .6832 
Alpha .1254 .2923   .794 1.980 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha = 0: chibar2(01) = 382.64 Prob>Chibar2 = 0.000 
 
The results from negative binomial regression for Model 1, which aimed to test the 
deprivation theory of prison violence, show that the model was statistically significant (LR χ2= 
55.92, p=0.000), meaning that at least one of the regression coefficients would not be equal to 
zero (ats.ucla.edu10) or that there would be an effect by the predictor variables on the occurrence 
of violent events. 
However, negative binomial regression gives a pseudo R-squared measure whose 
interpretation cannot be analogous to the R squared measure used for goodness of fit in OLS 
regression because maximum likelihood estimates are arrived at through an iterative process 
(citation).  Nevertheless, the McFadden's pseudo-R squared can be used to compare different 
models using the same dataset.  Thus, higher values of the pseudo-R squared would indicate a 
10 Source: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata_nbreg_output.htm  
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better fit for that model over the one with a lower pseudo-R squared (ats.ucla.edu11). The pseudo 
R-squared value for Model 1, which tested the deprivation hypothesis of prison violence, was 
13.58%. 
Let us recall that, in order to simplify the interpretation of findings from negative 
binomial regression models, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are re-shown instead of negative 
binomial coefficients.  Thus, in terms of the variables included in Model 1, the occupany rate 
variable had a positive, statistically-significant IRR coefficient of 1.0077 (p=0.009), meaning 
that that there would be a positive association between overcrowding and the occurrence of 
violent events; more precisely, this means that for each additional one-percent increase in the 
occupancy rate a prison had, it is expected an increase in the rate of violent events by 0.8% 
(IRR=1.0077).   
The mistreatment by guards variable (*100) showed an IRR value of 1.021 (p=0.023), 
which was statistically significant.  This means, first of all, that a positive association was found 
between the proportion of inmates reporting having suffered mistreatment by guards in a 
particular facility and the occurrence of violent events in that prison.  More precisely, this means 
that for each additional 1% increase in the aggregate report of mistreatment at a prison,12 there is 
an expected 2.1% increase in the rate of violent events. 
Finally, the log-transformed-over-dispersion parameter (/lnalpha) was estimated.  If this 
alpha value is close to zero, then a Poisson model would have been more appropriate to use than 
a negative binomial regression model.  On the other hand, if the likelihood ratio test showed an 
alpha other zero, a negative binomial regression model would be more suitable for analyzing the 
11 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/Psuedo_RSquareds.htm  
12 Let us recall that mistreatment by guards is an average measure of physical and psychological mistreatment by 
guards reported by inmates who responded to SURVEY in 2013 at 75 facilities. 
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data.  In Model 1, the chi-squared value was 382.64 with one degree of freedom (p=0.000), 
which suggests that alpha is non-zero and that the negative binomial model was more appropriate 
than the Poisson model for analyzing these data.  This procedure was repeated for each of the 
models, and the negative binomial regression was always found to be the appropriate technique. 
 Following the same strategy, Model 2 tested the administrative-control model and its two 
variables: program participation and the proportion of inmates in solitary confinement 
(multiplied by 100), adjusting for inmate total population, as well.  The results of the model are 
presented in Table 8: 
TABLE 8: Model 2 Administrative-Control Theory  
 
Negative Binomial Regression 
 
Dispersion         = mean 
Log Likelihood = -172.25 
 Number of Obs =   75 
LR chi2 (2)       =   67.41 
Prob > chi2       =   0.0000 
Pseudo R2        =    0.1636 
Events IRR Std.  Error Z P> z [95% Confidence Interval] 
Program 
participation  
.472 .130 -2.71 0.007 .2743 .8122 
% in solitary 
confinement 
(*100) 
1.033 .0082 4.10 0.000 1.017 1.049 
Total Inmate 
Population 
1.0012 .0001 6.47 0.000 1.0008 1.0016 
Constant 1.625 .901 0.88 .381 .548 4.819 
/lnalpha -.024 .248   -.511 .462 
Alpha .975 .242   .599 1.587 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha = 0: chibar2(01) = 320.94 Prob>Chibar2 = 0.000 
 
The results from negative binomial regression for Model 2, which aimed to test the 
administrative-control theory of prison violence, showed that the model was statistically 
significant (LR χ2= 67.41, p=0.000), meaning that at least one of the regression coefficients would 
not be equal to zero (web citation13) or that there would be an effect by the predictor variables 
from the administrative-control model on the occurrence of violent events. 
13 Source: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata_nbreg_output.htm  
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In addition, the pseudo R-squared measure for Model 2 that tested the administrative-
control hypothesis of prison violence was 16.36%, which was a bit higher than the pseudo R-
squared value for Model 1; this difference suggests that, when both the deprivation and the 
administrative-control models are compared, the administrative-control model would have a 
slightly higher explanatory power for the occurrence of violent events than the deprivation 
hypothesis. 
In terms of the variables included in Model 2, the variable program participation had an 
IRR coefficient of .472 (p=0.007), meaning that there would be a negative association between 
inmates’ participation in prison programming and the occurrence of violent events.  More 
precisely, this means that for each additional program that is implemented in a prison for all 
inmates,14 it is expected that there will be a decrease in the rate of violent events by 
approximately 53% (IRR=.472).   
Regarding the variable proportion of inmates in solitary confinement (*100), there was a 
statistically significant value of IRR at 1.033 (p=0.000).  This means, first of all, that there was 
found a positive association between the proportion of inmates who reported having suffered 
mistreatment by guards in a particular facility and the occurrence of violent events in that prison.  
More precisely, this suggest that for each additional one-percent increase in the aggregate report 
of inmates in solitary confinement at a prison, there is an expected an increase in the rate of 
violent events by 3.3%. 
Table 9 (below) shows the results of Model 3, which tested the importation hypothesis of 
prison violence by considering inmates’ average age at the facility level and the proportion of 
14 Since program participation was defined as a composite score on the total average number of programs that are 
available for all (surveyed) inmates in a particular facility, a one-unit change of this composite score supposes an 
average increment of one program in that particular prison for all inmates.  Let us recall that the actual values of this 
composite score ranged from 0.67 to 2.6 in the analytic sample of 75 facilities. 
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inmates classified by the Gendarmería as “highly engaged” in criminal activities (multiplied by 
100), while controlling for the total inmate population. 
The results from the negative binomial regression for Model 3 showed that the model was 
statistically significant (LR χ2= 78.23, p=0.000), meaning that at least one of the regression 
coefficients would not be equal to zero (web citation15) or that there would be an effect from the 
predictor variables in the importation model on the occurrence of violent events. 
TABLE 9: Model 3 Importation Theory  
 
Negative Binomial Regression 
 
Dispersion         = mean 
Log Likelihood = -166.84 
 Number of Obs =   75 
LR chi2 (3)       =   78.23 
Prob > chi2       =   0.0000 
Pseudo R2        =    0.1899 
Events IRR Std.  Error Z P> z [95% Confidence Interval] 
Age 
(Average)  
.701 .061 -4.04 0.000 .590 .833 
% of highly-
engaged 
inmate (*100) 
1.049 .0168 2.99 0.003 1.016 1.08 
Total Inmates 
Population 
1.0008 .0002 3.99 0.000 1.0004 1.0012 
Constant 139238.8 416877.8 3.96 0.000 393.80 4920000 
/lnalpha -.1702 .2493   -.659 .3184 
Alpha .8434 .2103   .5173 1.375 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha = 0: chibar2(01) = 246.34 Prob>Chibar2 = 0.000 
 
In addition, the pseudo R-squared measure for Model 3 (testing the importation 
hypothesis of prison violence) was 18.99%, a higher value in comparison to both the deprivation 
and the administrative-control model (Models 1 and 2) .  This finding suggests that importation 
model would have a higher explanatory power for the occurrence of violent events than the other 
two hypotheses. 
In terms of the variables included in Model 3, the variable inmates’ average age had a 
statistically-significant IRR coefficient of .701 (p=0.000), meaning that there would be a 
15 Source: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata_nbreg_output.htm  
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negative association between program inmates’ age and the occurrence of violent events in a 
prison facility.  More precisely, this means that for each additional increment of a inmates’ 
average age a prison, there is an expected decrease in the rate of violent events by approximately 
30% (IRR=.701).   
Regarding the variable proportion of inmates in solitary confinement (*100), there was a 
statistically significant value of IRR at 1.049 (p=0.003), suggesting that there would be a positive 
association between the proportion of inmates classified as highly engaged in criminal activities 
(a proxy for criminal history) and the occurrence of violent events in that particular prison.  More 
precisely, the IRR value indicates that for each additional one-percent increase in the proportion 
of highly engaged inmates housed at a prison, there is an expected increase in the rate of violent 
events by 4.9%. Table 10 shows the results from Model 4, the Full Model, which included 
variables from the deprivation, from the administrative-control and from the importation models.   
TABLE 10: Model 4 Full Model  
Negative Binomial Regression 
 
Dispersion         = mean 
Log Likelihood = -162.25 
 Number of Obs =   75 
LR chi2 (2)       =   87.41 
Prob > chi2       =   0.0000 
Pseudo R2        =    0.2122 
Events IRR Std.  Error Z P> z [95% Confidence Interval] 
Occupancy 
rate 
1.0032 .0028 1.11 0.267 .9975 1.0089 
mistreatment 
by guards 
(*100) 
.9991 .0090 -0.10 0.923 .9814 1.0170 
Program 
participation  
.688 .1986 -1.29 0.195 .3907 1.2118 
% in solitary 
confinement 
(*100) 
1.015 .0097 1.58 0.114 .9963 1.0344 
Average 
Inmate Age 
.786 .0679 -2.78 0.005 .6641 .9315 
% highly-
engaged inm. 
1.042 .0149 2.89 0.004 1.0134 1.0719 
Total Inmate 
Population 
1.0008 .0002 4.20 0.000 1.0004 1.0012 
Constant 2203.26 6564.82 2.58 0.010 6.409 757353.3 
/lnalpha -.443 .272   -.977 .091 
Alpha .642 .175   .376 1.095 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha = 0 chibar2(01) = 196.85 Prob>Chibar2 = 0.000 
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 The results from the Model 4, which aimed to test all together the deprivation, the 
administrative-control, and the importation theories of prison violence (along with the control 
variable), showed an statistically significant model (LR χ2= 87.41, p=0.000), meaning that at least 
one of the regression coefficients would not be equal to zero (ats.ucla.edu16) or that there would 
be an effect from the predictor variables on the occurrence of violent events. 
In terms of the variables included in the Full Model, only three of the indicators were 
found to be significant: inmates’ average age, proportion of inmates classified as highly-engaged 
in criminal activities, and total inmate population.  The first two variables were related to the 
importation theory of prison violence, and the third was the control variable. 
The first significant variable in the Full Model, inmates’ average age, showed an IRR of 
.786 (p=0.005), indicating a negative association between inmates’ average age and the 
occurrence of violent events in a prison facility.  More precisely, this means that for each 
additional increment in inmates’ average age at a prison, there is an expected decrease in the rate 
of violent events by approximately 30% (IRR=.701), while holding the rest of the variables 
constant. In other words, a higher concentration of younger inmates is a predictors of the 
occurrence of violent events. 
The second significant variable, the proportion of inmates classified by the Gendarmería 
as highly-engaged in criminal activities (*100), showed a statistically-significant IRR of 1.042 
(p=0.004), indicating a positive association between the proportion of inmates classified as 
highly engaged in criminal activities (a proxy for criminal history) and the occurrence of violent 
events in that particular prison in Chile.  More precisely, the IRR value indicates that for each 
16 Source: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata_nbreg_output.htm  
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additional one-percent increase in the proportion of highly engaged inmates housed at a prison, 
the rate of violent events it is expected to increase by 4.2%. In other words, prisons with higher 
proportions of highly-engaged inmates would be at more risk of having violent events. 
The third significant variable of the Full Model was the control variable, total inmate 
population, with an IRR of 1.0008 indicating a positive association between the number of 
prisoners at a facility and the expected occurrence of violent events.  In addition, the IRR 
suggests that for each additional inmate a prison houses, the rate of occurrence of violent events 
can be expected to increase by 0.08%.  In other words, for each additional 100 individuals that 
enter into a certain prison, it is expected that the rate of violent events would increase by 8%.   
Thus, the results of the Full Model seem to lend preliminary support for the importation 
model of prison violence, since two out of three of the significant variables were representative 
of the importation model.  Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the pseudo R-squared 
measure for Model 4 was 21.22%, which is the highest pseudo R-squared value in comparison to 
the previous models (Models 1, 2 and 3).  This value suggests, therefore, that the three theories 
could be complementary explanations for prison violence rather than competing ones. 
In sum, results from the Full Model mean that even after controlling for other variables 
and adjusting for prison population size, prisons with either higher concentrations of younger 
inmates or with higher concentrations of highly engaged prisoners should have a higher number 
of violent events in a year.  In addition, in larger prisons (those which house more inmates) one 
would also expect a higher number of violent events to happen. 
The other variables—occupancy rate, the proportion of inmates reporting mistreatment 
by guards, program participation, and the proportion of inmates who report having been in 
solitary confinement—were non-statistically significant in the Full Model. 
77 
 
In order to facilitate an interpretation of the results presented in the Full Model, two 
additional procedures were conducted: marginal effects and margins plot.  Marginal effects were 
applied to estimate the changes in the prediction of violent events when changes in a specific 
independent variable are applied, while holding the rest of the independent variables constant at 
a fixed value.  Cameron & Trivedi refer to marginal effects as “partial effects” and describe them 
as follows: “A ME [marginal effect], or partial effect, most often measures the effect on the 
conditional mean of y of a change in one of the regressors, say Xk.  In the linear regression 
model, the ME equals the relevant slope coefficient, greatly simplifying analysis.  For nonlinear 
models, this is no longer the case, leading to remarkably many different methods for calculating 
MEs” (p. 333).  In this study, the rest of the independent variables were fixed at their means 
values.  This was done by employing the command <margins> that is present in Stata 13.0 (Stata 
Corp, 2013).   
In addition, the command <marginsplot>, also available in Stata 13.0 (StataCorp, 2013), 
was applied in order to give a graphic representation of the changes in the predictions of violent 
events, while changing the values of a certain independent variable and holding the rest of the 
independent variable set constant (at their means, in this case).  This representation is helpful not 
only for visualizing the predicted count of the mean value for violent events in each facility, but 
also for seeing the 95% confidence interval around such a prediction.   
Thus, results from Table 11 (net page) show the predicted counts for violent events at 
various levels of occupancy rates, while holding the other independent and control variables 
constant at their means. 
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TABLE 11: Predictive Counts for Violent Events at various levels of Occupancy Rates 
 
Predictive Margins   Model VCE: OIM Number of observations: 75 
Expression: Predicted Number of Events, predict ( ) 
Delta Method 
  Margin Std.  error Z p>Z 95% Confidence Interval 
1._at Occupancy = 0 7.12 3.55 2.01 0.045 .161 14.08 
2._at Occupancy = 25 7.17 3.45 2.23 0.026 .938 14.49 
3._at Occupancy = 50 8.36 3.38 2.47 0.013 1.73 14.98 
4._at Occupancy = 75 9.05 3.46 2.71 0.007 2.50 15.61 
5._at Occupancy = 100  9.81 3.39 2.89 0.004 3.15 16.47 
6._at Occupancy = 125 10.63 3.58 2.96 0.003 3.6 17.67 
7._at Occupancy = 150  11.52 3.96 2.91 0.004 3.75 19.29 
8._at Occupancy = 175  12.48 4.55 2.74 0.006 3.56 21.41 
9._at Occupancy = 200  13.53 5.38 2.51 0.012 2.98 24.07 
10._at Occupancy = 225 14.66 6.45 2.27 0.023 2.01 27.31 
11._at Occupancy = 250  15.88 7.78 2.04 0.041 .635 31.13 
12._at Occupancy = 275 17.21 9.3 1.84 0.066 -1.15 35.58 
13._at Occupancy = 300 18.65 11.24 1.66 0.097 -3.38 40.68 
 
Results from Table 11 show the computed predictive margins for violent events when 
occupancy rates are modified and the rest of the predictor and control variables are held constant.  
Predictive margins were computed based on occupancy rates ranging from 0% up to 300% (an 
uncommon, but real value for a couple of the prisons in the country).  The margins for violent 
events varied from about 7 up to almost 19 events.  As the occupancy rate increased, so did the 
predicted counts for violent events, yet the margins were not significant when the occupancy rate 
was extremely high (275% or above).  These results are graphically displayed in Figure 4 (next 
page). 
Here, the 95% confidence intervals for the predicted margins of violent events remained 
relatively tight when occupancy rates ranged between 25% and 150%.  Once occupancy rate 
surpasses 150%, the confidence intervals of the prediction expand both in lower bound and in 
upper bound and the predictions, though still significant, become much wider and imprecise.    
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FIGURE 4: Predictive Margins for violent events at various levels of occupancy rates 
 
In other words, when modifying the occupancy rate and holding the rest of the predictor 
and control variables constant at their means (for a “typical prison”), one may expect that the 
occurrence of violent events would appear as shown in Figure 4 (above).  Let us recall that a 
“typical prison” would have the following traits: 36% of inmates reporting mistreatment by 
guards; half of inmates participating in one program and the other half in two (mean program 
participation=1.63); about one third of inmates (32.7%) having been in solitary confinement; an 
average inmate age of 34.2 years; and 14.4% of the prison population classified as “highly 
engaged” in criminal activities.   
Results from Table 12 (next page) show the predicted counts for violent events at various 
levels of average inmate ages, while holding the other independent and control variables constant 
at their means. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
P
re
di
ct
ed
 N
um
be
r O
f E
ve
nt
s
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300
occupancy
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
80 
 
TABLE 12: Predictive Counts for Violent Events at various inmates’ average ages 
 
Predictive Margins    
Model VCE: OIM 
Number of observations: 75 
Expression: Predicted Number of Events, predict ( ) 
 
Delta Method 
 
  Margin Std.  error Z p>Z 95% Confidence Interval 
1._at Age = 28 44.7 31.3 1.43 0.154 -16.7 106.1 
2._at Age = 29 35.1 22.3 1.57 0.116 -8.6 78.9 
3._at Age = 30 27.6 15.9 1.73 0.083 -3.5 58.9 
4._at Age = 31 21.7 11.4 1.91 0.057 -.61 44.1 
5._at Age = 32 17.1 8.2 2.07 0.038 .92 33.2 
6._at Age = 33 13.4 6.1 2.21 0.027 1.4 25.4 
7._at Age = 34 10.5 4.6 2.28 0.023 1.4 19.7 
8._at Age = 35 8.3 3.6 2.26 0.024 1.1 15.5 
9._at Age = 36 6.5 3.0 2.17 0.030 .62 12.4 
10._at Age = 37 5.1 2.5 2.02 0.044 .15 10.1 
11._at Age = 38 4.0 2.1 1.85 0.064 -.24 8.3 
12._at Age = 39 3.1 1.8 1.68 0.093 -.53 6.9 
13._at Age = 40 2.5 1.6 1.52 0.128 -.72 5.7 
 
Results from Table 12 show the computed predictive margins for violent events when 
inmates’ average ages are modified and the rest of the predictor and control variables are held 
constant.  Predictive margins were computed based on average ages ranging from 28 to 40 years.  
The margins for violent events varied from about 45 to almost 3 events.  As the age increased, 
the predicted counts for violent events decreased, yet the margins were significant only between 
the average ages of 32 and 37.  These results are graphically displayed in Figure 5 in next page. 
The 95% confidence intervals for the predicted margins of violent events remained wide 
when inmates’ average age ranged between 28 and 30 years.  Once average reached 31 years, the 
confidence intervals of the predicted counts became tighter.    
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FIGURE 5: Predictive Margins for violent events at various levels of inmates’ ages 
 
In other words, when modifying the inmates’ average age and holding the rest of the 
predictor and control variables constant at their means (in a “typical prison”), one can expect that 
occurrence of violent events would appear as shown in Figure 5.  Let us recall that a “typical 
prison” would have the following traits: it would have an occupancy rate of 126% (or 26% 
overcrowding); 36% of inmates would report having experienced mistreatment by guards; half of 
inmates would participate in one program and the other half in two (mean program 
participation=1.63); about one third of inmates (32.7%) would have been in solitary confinement 
in that facility; and 14.4% of the population would be classified as highly engaged in criminal 
activities.   
Results from Table 13 show the computed predictive margins for violent events when the 
proportion of inmates classified as “highly engaged” in criminal activities varies, for the “typical 
prison” (meaning one that has an occupancy rate of 126% [or, an average overcrowding of 26%]; 
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36% of inmates report having experienced mistreatment by guards; half of inmates participate in 
one program and the other half in two [program participation=1.63]; about one third of inmates 
(32.7%) have been in solitary confinement in that facility; and an inmates’ average age is 34.2 
years). 
TABLE 13: Predictive Counts for Violent Events at various proportions of inmates highly-engaged 
in criminal activities (multiplied by 100) 
Predictive Margins    
Model VCE: OIM 
Number of observations: 75 
Expression: Predicted Number of Events, predict ( ) 
 
Delta Method 
 
  Margin Std.  error Z p>Z 95% Confidence Interval 
1._at % high = 0 3.3 1.8 1.79 0.074 -.32 6.9 
2._at % high = 10 5.0 2.2 2.25 0.025 .64 9.4 
3._at % high = 20 7.6 2.6 2.84 0.005 2.3 12.8 
4._at % high = 30 11.5 3.4 3.32 0.001 4.7 18.3 
5._at % high = 40 17.4 5.4 3.19 0.001 6.7 28.1 
6._at % high = 50 26.3 10.1 2.60 0.009 6.5 46.2 
7._at % high = 60 39.9 19.4 2.05 0.040 1.8 77.9 
8._at % high = 70 60.3 36.6 1.65 0.099 -11.4 132.1 
 
Predictive margins were computed based on various combinations of proportions, 
ranging from 0% (small prisons usually having no highly engaged inmates, since small facilities 
do not meet the security criteria for housing them) to up to 70% (the usual case for some large, 
private prisons).  The mean value of the predictions for violent events (or margin) varied from 
about 3 up to almost 60 events, where almost all of the values are significant except for the first 
and the last ones.  As the proportion of highly engaged inmates increased, so did the predicted 
counts for violent events, showing a positive association between the occurrence of violent 
events and inmates’ criminal history.   
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Figure 6: Predictive counts for various proportions of inmates highly-engaged in criminal activities  
 
At the same time, as shown in Figure 6, the 95% confidence intervals for the predicted 
margins of violent events remained relatively tight when the proportion of highly-engaged 
inmates ranged between 0% and 30%.  Beyond that percentage, the predicted count sharply 
increased and the margins of violent events became wider.    
Results shown in Figure 7 (next page) illustrate the predictive margins for violent events 
when the control variable, the total inmate population, is modified and the independent variables 
are held constant at their mean values, i.e. a prison that with an occupancy rate of 126% (or, an 
average overcrowding of 26%); 36% of inmates reporting having experienced mistreatment by 
guards; half of inmates participating in one program and the other half in two (program 
participation=1.63); one third of inmates (32.7%) having been in solitary confinement in that 
facility; and an average inmate age of 34.2 years. 
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Figure 7: Predictive margins for violent events at various levels of total inmate population 
 
Results from Figure 7 show that as the total inmate population increased (with the other 
predictor variables held constant), so did the predictive margins for violent events.  Small prisons 
showed very small predictive margins, too, but when population size reached 1,500 individuals, 
the predicted counts sharply increased and the confidence intervals broadened as well.   
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Chapter V 
Conclusion and Discussion 
Scholars on prison violence have argued that violence behind bars will be caused by 
different factors.  Some have argued that the forced deprivations to which inmates are subjected 
while incarcerated will cause violence, while others have maintained that poor prison 
management and other organizational-related factors will be the cause of violence inside prisons. 
A third group has reasoned that the roots of prison violence can be located in the background and 
history prior to incarceration that inmates bring to prison.  Nevertheless, up to the present date, 
no previous research had systematically examined the topic of prison violence in Chilean 
prisons, despite some anecdotal evidence or statistical records on the annual number of deaths or 
injured inmates, none of which incorporates any analysis of covariates. 
Thus, using administrative data from 75 Chilean facilities, this dissertation studied the 
correlates of violent events that were officially registered as such by the Gendarmería de Chile 
in 2012.  The main goals of this research project were to examine what variables were the main 
correlates of violent events in Chilean prisons, which model of prison violence (from among 
deprivation, importation or administrative-control theories) had more empirical support when 
competing models were analyzed altogether, and how the correlates of prison violence change 
when the influence of population size is taken into account.  In sum, the findings of this research 
offer a first initial account for prison violence in Chilean prisons. 
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In line with the study’s expectations, findings reveal that the three explanations for prison 
violence (deprivation, administrative-control, and the importation theories) seem to be 
complementary explanations rather than competing ones, at least for the Chilean case.  Indeed, 
when models of prison violence were separately analyzed (Models 1, 2 and 3), each model 
showed pseudo various R-squared values that ranged between 13.58% and 18.99%, which did 
not seem to represent a major dominance in terms of the degree to which each model accounted 
for variations in violent events.  In addition, the variables representing each theory were all 
found to be significantly associated with violent events while running models 1, 2, and 3 
separately.   
In addition, in the Full Model, inmates’ average age remained as a significant predictor of 
violent events, even after including variables from the other two theories and while also 
controlling for population size.  Inmates’ age and violence were found to be negatively 
associated, which was consistent with previous studies on prison violence in developed 
countries, as well as with the daily experience of officers, guards, and my own visits to dozens of 
Chilean prisons in 2013. Through informal interviews and conversations that the author had with 
prison officers and guards, it became apparent that there are some changes in the inmate 
composition in recent years in Chile in terms of, for example, inmates’ average age and that they 
would be more prone to violent behavior, even among their fellow prisoners: these days –they 
said—it is more common to see younger inmates arriving to prison facilities. In this regard, an 
older prisoner said: “things have changed a lot here… in the past, we had rules: just robbing, no 
killing if unnecessary (…) today, youngsters kill people for a few bucks and they have no respect 
for authority…they just came and think they can do whatever they want to…” (inmate in his 
40’s, Penitentiary of Santiago).    
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In addition, and in line with the study’s expectations, the proportion of inmates identified 
by the Gendarmería as highly engaged in criminal behavior, used here as a proxy variable for 
criminal history, was also found to be positively associated with the occurrence of violent events 
in the Full Model in our sample. Using Drury and De Lisi’s (2010) expression, findings 
supported the idea that “the past is prologue” for current violence, at least for the dependent 
variable here considered. Despite that Gendarmería itself has criticized this indicator for being 
only self-reported, it seems that it is still helpful for classification purposes. 
In line with my expectations, too, the total inmate population was positively associated to 
the occurrence of violent events, and its influence resisted the statistical influence of many other 
variables. One explanation for this positive association could be related to the competition for 
scarce prison resources that takes places as the inmate population increases. A complementary 
explanation for this positive association could be that as the prison population increases, prison 
life becomes more anonymous and inmates may feel that their needs are not met by an 
increasingly more-distant administration not just in terms of food or clothes but also in terms of 
“attention” and opportunities to be recognized as an individual human being. In this regard, some 
inmates used to tell me that “here, guards do not talk to you… they just open up and close the 
cage’s doors but are not interested in how you are or who you are…” (young inmate, southern, 
mid-size Chilean prison). 
On the other hand, my hypotheses for the administrative-control theory of prison violence 
maintained that either coercive controls (the proportion of inmates in solitary confinement) 
and/or remunerative controls (inmates’ participation in prison programming) were both going to 
be significant predictors of violence, with positively associations in the first case and negative 
associations in the second.  Nevertheless, and contrary to my expectations, neither program 
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participation nor the proportion of inmates in solitary confinement were significant predictors of 
violence in the Full Model.   
It is possible that the non-significant coefficient for program participation may have had 
to do with the composite score employed for developing such a measure; indeed, this study 
created a composite score for program participation by simply combining responses on six 
programs of very different nature, including sports, job skills, access to an in-prison paid job, 
arts, psycho-social intervention, and a high school in-prison program (i.e., educational 
programs). These different programs may serve different purposes, and it’s possible that 
participation in all of them may not necessarily serve to reduce violence or to tackle a 
criminogenic need (Andrews, Bonta & Wormith, 2011).  The six programs may all have the 
common characteristic of occupying time, but there is a difference between individuals “using” 
time versus those “filling in” time (Alzúa, Rodrigues & Villa, 2008), not to mention the limited 
access of inmates to in-prison programs or concern over the internal consistency of these 
programs, which has been identified as a pre-requisite for program success (Andrews & Bonta, 
2006). A complementary, possible explanation for this lack of significance is the relatively low 
proportion of inmates having access to a decent program, meant by that an structured, monitored 
set of activities with a purpose of developing certain skills and/or prepare inmates for their future 
release. Indeed, in Chilean prisons, program access to a decent program is pretty much of a 
luxury and, thus, this variable operates in practice more of a constant rather than as a variable in 
the prison system. In this regard, the Chilean Institute of Human Rights (INDH, 2012) has 
criticized current policies that associate job skills and working opportunities to good behavior, 
whereas the literature on offenders’ treatment has suggested precisely that programs should 
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target most difficult inmates in order to reduce future recidivism (Andres, Bonta & Wormith, 
2011). 
 The non-statistical significance of the proportion of inmates in solitary confinement may 
be due to the fact that the use of solitary confinement is widespread in many Chilean facilities, 
generally under inhumane conditions. Indeed, the practice is often neither “solitary” (the author 
of this study himself observed up to six inmates locked up in a 3 meter- by 3 meter-cell), nor 
“confinement” (because the expression used to name these cells really means “punishment 
cells,” and they were such in practice).  Alternatively, this lack of significance may be explained 
by the use of solitary confinement as a response by guards (and/or by instructions from prison 
officers or higher-ups) to a violent environment and, thus, in a cross-sectional study, it is difficult 
to clearly figure out the direction of these two variables (use of solitary confinement and violent 
events). 
Besides, the two variables representing the deprivation hypothesis of prison violence 
(occupancy rate and mistreatment by guards) were found to be non-significantly associated with 
prison violence in the Full Model.  The non-significance of occupancy rate may perhaps have to 
do with the fact that overcrowding is widespread across Chilean prisons.  Indeed, overcrowding 
and infrastructure problems were reported by inmates and also corroborated by the principal 
investigator during inspection visits throughout the country, with rare exceptions. These 
problems affect the entire system (the average occupancy rate supposedly reaches 127%), but 
there were great variations from prison to prison (occupancy rates in some cases rise above 
300%).  Improvement for overcrowding probably needs to be addressed by the central 
government, in the mid- or long-term, since it may be necessary either to build more prisons or 
to make legal modifications so that fewer people are sent to prison. Nevertheless, the way in 
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which the mere concept of “capacity according to design” (which serves as the basis for the 
subsequent definition of the term “overcrowding”) has been defined may be subject to more 
public and academic discussions, since it might be the case that it is inconsistent with 
international standards for the humane treatment of prisoners. In this regard, it may be illustrative 
a visit to the Chilean prison system that a group of British experts from the Inspectorate of 
Prisons conducted in October 2013, when they lectured on their monitoring work and showed 
photographs of “the worst facility in the country (UK)”; the Chilean audience immediately 
noticed that even the worst UK prison had higher standards of space and comfort than the best 
Chilean facility. 
 In addition, perhaps some of the reasons why the proportion of inmates reporting 
mistreatment by guards was not significant had to do, again, with the common and widespread 
experience of mistreatment by guards that inmates experience in Chilean prisons.  Liebling 
(2004) has argued that the quality of prison life must include an emphasis on the moral 
performance of prisons with regard to the concepts of trust, respect, fairness, order, and well-
being.  For her, “performance” departs from a mere managerial focus or from mere concerns 
about infrastructure and argues that along with the exterior legitimacy (Sparks, 1994), what 
matters most in daily prison life is the interior legitimacy: how prison life is lived by staff and 
prisoners and a focus on finding what “mattered most,” relationships, fairness, order, and the 
quality of treatment.  In addition, she proposed a way to empirically assess these dimensions in 
five prisons in the United Kingdom and found significant differences across facilities in these 
five areas of prison life.  
After having visited in person around 50 facilities nationwide in 2013 and led the 
research team that visited the other 25 prisons, I could reasonably say that Chilean prisons do not 
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fulfill basic requirements that may put them even close to achieve exterior legitimacy; as one 
moves inside prisons, it becomes apparent that not even decent levels of interior legitimacy are 
achieved and one questions why the entire system does not, simply, collapse in light of current 
situation. In this regard, while some prison guards use to jokily say that “God must be prison 
guard…otherwise, we do not know how it is possible that the system still does not collapse”, 
others recognize that “we know for sure that there is going to be another San Miguel [recalling 
the infamous 2010 prison fire that killed 81 inmates]…what we do not know exactly is when…”. 
In terms of personnel, prisons in Latin America also have considerable deficits with 
regard to sufficient numbers of qualified, well-trained, and well-paid personnel that can maintain 
order and discipline while also contributing to the inmates’ rehabilitation: “everything here is so 
precarious that you have no guidelines or rules on how to do many tasks…but you got to do what 
you got do and so (…) for example, if you need to make 200 inmates to get out of their collective 
[dormitory], you need to make that happen somehow…”. Unfortunately, corruption and violence 
are not uncommon, and these render prison environments places of even broader human rights 
violations (Salla & Ballesteros 2008).  Although some have argued in favor of separating the 
functions of custody and rehabilitation, stating that uniformed prison personnel would—and 
should—privilege order and security above everything else, during the experience of conducting 
the nationwide assessment, we perceived that many prison guards and officers do subscribe to 
the rehabilitative ideal (Cullen, Latessa, Burton & Lombardo, 1993).  Further, the deficits of the 
system in this regard may have to do, at least partially, with a mix of inappropriate training, 
limited social recognition, and insufficient human and material resources from the state. 
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Limitations of this research 
Despite its potential contribution to the literature on prison violence, this work has some 
limitations that must be taken into account when considering the findings. Some of them have to 
do with the definition of violence used in this study, the use of administrative records and 
surveys, the small sample size with only 75 cases, the cross-sectional nature of the study, and the 
lack of individual-level information.   
In terms of the definition of violence used by this study, it is worth noting that it was 
circumscribed by violent events recorded as such by each prison facility nationwide, according to 
legal provisions included in the Penitentiary Code. This study employed these records as the 
dependent variable but the phenomenon of prison violence may include different manifestations 
than simply physical, interpersonal fights among inmates. Indeed, I have not included in this 
study the inmate-staff category of physical violence, nor the violence exercised by staff or guards 
towards inmates. Having said that, double-check mechanisms were applied to make sure that at 
least the definition employed in this study could be a valid and reliable initial proxy of prison 
violence.  
A second limitation of this dissertation could be the fact that it employed aggregated, 
facility-level variables with no individual-level information available. This was certainly a 
limitation because inmates’ characteristics are important to understanding prison violence (Drury 
& De Lisi, 2010; Kuanliang & Sorensen, 2008). However, the main reason for such lack of 
individual data had to do with ethical reasons: the possibility of identifying inmates’ individual 
responses and the risk of reprisals or future retaliation against them (let us recall that that was the 
main reason why data from SURVEY were anonymized –identifiers removed and deleted—after 
data collection took place in 2013).  
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A third limitation had to do with the use of secondary, administrative data, which implies 
the possibility of some inconsistency while recording violent events across different prisons. 
Administrative records usually have not been thought to inform social research and, 
consequently, they have not considered scientific criteria for their formulation, nor have they 
passed through control mechanisms. Besides, despite of there are legal provisions that instruct 
prison guards on when and how to recognize and record “a violent event,” administrative records 
may have been recorded according to different subjective criteria, as prison environments may 
vary in the way individual officers and guards perceive and register a “violent event” (Hemmens 
& Marquart, 2000). Nonetheless, various double-check mechanisms were applied to make sure 
that administrative records (particularly those involving the dependent variable violent events) 
could be taken as valid and reliable indicators of prison violence; some of these mechanisms 
included interviews with prison officers and guards, a review of the Chilean penitentiary law, 
and different working meetings with the Statistical Department of Gendarmería.  
The use of survey data had limitations too. Indeed, SURVEY included 42 questions many 
of which were binary (yes/no format) and asked the respondent to think about his stay in the 
current facility.  It is known that the reality of prisons is much more complex than yes/no type of 
answers, and it is not known what factors may have influenced inmates to respond the way they 
did.  Neither are we sure about how much of a recall problem inmates responding to the 
SURVEY may have had.  In addition, since the unit of analysis was prisons and not individuals, 
the sample size was small, composed of only 75 prisons.  This factor, combined with the 
relatively large number of independent variables (six in total, plus one control) that were used in 
the models, resulted in a very tight variable/case ratio.  Thus, although the use of multivariate 
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negative binomial regression models seemed to be appropriate for analyzing these data, this 
technique would probably work better if employed with larger sample sizes.   
A last limitation that needs to be taken into consideration is the fact that findings from 
this study were cross-sectional in nature. Indeed, data used for this project did not provide any 
reference to a previous history of violence by facilities, nor the data revealed possible 
administrative-related changes with regard to the arrival and influence of new officers or 
administrators at the regional level.. Nonetheless, this study was the first systematic assessment 
of the entire prison system and prison life in Chile ever done and, thus, it is expected that future 
research can contribute to monitor longitudinal changes. 
The Study’s Strengths  
Many variables for this study were taken from the SURVEY that was conducted in 2013 
in 75 facilities with a response rate of 78%.  Despite the fact that there is no perfect survey, the 
high response rate (which is pretty uncommon for prison studies); the random, stratified strategy 
that it employed; the procedures employed by researchers (for example, guards were never 
present when the SURVEY was applied); and the number of prisons visited (75 out of 83) allow 
me to feel confident that the data taken from that study is valid and reliable.  In addition, this 
study employed a combination of administrative data and survey data with information at the 
aggregate, prison level, providing an innovative approach to studying prison violence.  In 
addition, this study included indicators for three theories of prison violence and empirically 
examined them all together, namely the deprivation, the importation, and the administrative-
control theories.  Finally, this study is the first in-depth and comprehensive study of prison 
violence in Chilean prisons, which would allow for valuable policy implications for prison 
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administrators and policymakers in the design and implementation of programs to reduce prison 
violence. 
Policy recommendations and future research 
Issues of overcrowding in Latin American prisons assume a dramatic picture that greatly 
differs from even the most crowded prison in a developed country.  From visits to a couple of 
Chilean facilities in 2013 and from meeting with British experts from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Prisons [HMIP], it was clear that although the official figures reveal certain percentages of 
overcrowding for facilities in both countries, overcrowding is far worse in Chile than in the UK 
as a result of operational standards employed to define “capacity according to design” and 
“overcrowding” standards in both countries. In addition, the prison context in many facilities in 
Latin America is shaped by marked corruption, drug dealing, and a lack of governance; these 
elements make “linear” comparisons with developed nations very problematic.   
Thus, in terms of policy recommendations, different scholars have argued that it is 
important to consider the development of proactive strategies that attempt to attack the 
underlying causes of violent events (rather than their effects) and to allow for the implementation 
of coherent programs that can prevent such negative occurrences.  In this regard, Byrne and 
Hummer (2007) proposed a variety of recommendations to deal with prison violence, including 
finding the “tipping point between formal and informal social control mechanisms” (p.  77), 
implementing systemic-level changes such as (1) increasing transparency in the prison system in 
order to promote accountability and continuous improvement; (2) adopting and implementing 
evidence-based practices in prison management; and (3) developing new, innovative measures of 
performance and quality for the prison system.  Regarding this last point, perhaps the work and 
suggestions of Liebling (2004) might be of interest for deepening this discussion. 
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These efforts will probably imply additional investment in terms of reducing 
overcrowding, improving infrastructure for prison programming, developing more specific 
training for prison guards and officers and increasing the accountability of the system, but, in the 
long run, these measures will also prove themselves cheaper than just waiting for the next violent 
event to take place in a prison (National Research Council, 2004; National Center for State 
Courts, 2003; National Research Council, 2001; Center for Civic Innovation, 2000). 
In addition, since it is not possible to modify inmates’ ages or individual-related factors 
associated with those who are sent by law to serve in-prison sentences, there might space to 
improve current in-prison program coverage which, according to the SURVEY, only reached a 
minority percentage of inmates.  In the same vein, though, it is important to look at program 
participation not only in terms of coverage, but also in terms of consistency with tackling 
criminogenic needs.  Indeed, although sports program have reached about half of inmates, they 
have not been found relevant to decreasing recidivism, to changing inmates’ attitudes, or to 
effecting signification modifications to anti-social behavior in the long run.  This is not to say, of 
course, that such programs should be eliminated but, rather, it is a call for prison reform in the 
sense that programs and other rehabilitative efforts should be more consistent and concatenated 
to rehabilitative purposes. 
In addition, efforts should be made to maintain prison population sizes at manageable 
levels, thus avoiding the extreme cases that are currently observable in the Chilean prison 
system, namely the coexistence of facilities with a few dozen inmates with the existence of 
prisons housing thousands of individuals.  This occurrence may tend to nullify possible the anti-
violence effects of other relevant variables, such as in-prison programs.   
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From a social work perspective, those who mostly fill out prisons in Latin America are 
disadvantaged individuals whose initial disadvantages are not going to improve after the 
experience of incarceration. At the same time, imprisoned populations in Chile remain relatively 
invisible for the rest of the society and so are the potential social causes associated with higher 
concentrations of poorer individuals incarcerated. In this regard, future research might make 
more visible part of these gaps in terms of educational levels, neighborhood disadvantage, 
poverty and so forth in order to generate empirical evidence that may help to reduce “social 
violence” associated to disadvantage and incarceration. 
Besides, the debate over deprivation, importation or administrative-control could be 
enriched inside Chilean prisons if further research, probably undertaken through a more 
ethnographic-oriented framework, could contribute to disentangling the mechanisms by which 
violence takes place in prisons. Indeed, survey or administrative data cannot answer how 
violence reproduces on prisons and further studies might examine in a more in-depth manner 
when, where, and how violence occurs inside specific facilities and what correlates 
(organizational, overcrowding, inmates’ characteristics) accompany those violent events in those 
specific places inside prisons.  It is noteworthy to recall that there are architectural, 
compositional, and organizational arrangements that may vary enormously from one site to 
another, even inside the same prison.  Future studies should attempt to identify and to analyze 
these differences in order to produce more detailed research on prison violence, especially in a 
developing country like Chile.  In sum, this study offered a preliminary, systematic contribution 
to the knowledge base on factors associated with prison violence in Chilean prisons.  Hopefully, 
this work will serve as a baseline for further studies in Chile and perhaps in Latin America. 
98 
 
The debate could also be enriched by conducting longitudinal studies on prison violence 
throughout the country, perhaps replicating this study’s methods and variables.  This is important 
since the Chilean prison system experiences changes, from time to time, that have to do with the 
three theories aforementioned.  For example, prison officers are moved to a different facility with 
varying periodicity, or prison conditions may be improved (or worsened) through administrative 
decisions.  Similarly, the number and the composition of inmates in a prison may vary as a result 
of administrative decisions or variations in sentencing policies.  Monitoring these changes and 
examining their potential impact on the occurrence of violent events will be important for 
establishing an evidence-based, preventive approach to minimize violence inside prisons.   
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